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ABSTRACT
Evaluation of Information Bundles
in Engineering Decisions. (August 2004)
Niyazi Onur Bakır, B.S., Bilkent University;
M.S., Texas A&M University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Georgia-Ann Klutke
This dissertation addresses the question of choosing the best information alterna-
tive in engineering decisions. The decision maker maximizes his expected utility under
uncertainty where both the action he takes and the state of the environment deter-
mines the payoff earned. The decision maker has an opportunity to gather information
about the decision environment a priori at a certain cost. There might be different
information alternatives, and the decision maker has to determine which alternative
offers ”better” prospects for improving the decision.
Any decision environment that is characterized by a finite number of outcomes and
a discrete probability distribution over the set of outcomes is a lottery. We analyze the
value of information on a single outcome and determine the attributes in each piece
of information that maximizes its value. Information is valuable when the decision is
changed after gathering information. We show that if the number of optimal actions
taken under different outcomes scenarios is finite, the decision maker does not require
the perfect information. Further, we analyze the relation between the value of informa-
tion and its determinants, and show a monotonic relation exists for a restricted class
of information bundles and utility functions. We use different approaches to evaluate
information and analyze the cases where preference reversals occur between different
approaches. We observe that a priori pricing of information does not necessarily induce
the same ranking with the expected utility approach, however both approaches agree
iv
on whether a given piece of information is valuable or not.
The second part of this dissertation evaluates information in both static and dy-
namic coinsurance problems. In static insurance decisions, we analyze the case where
the decision maker gathers information about the severity of the risk events and per-
form ranking of information bundles in a specific class. In dynamic insurance problems,
we make a case study to analyze different physical risks that the production facilities
are exposed to. The information in dynamic insurance problems involves more detail
with regard to the timing of the multiple risk events. We observe that information on
events that pose relatively good scenarios for the decision maker have value, however,
their value may diminish as their probability of occurance decreases. The decision
maker purchases more information as the profitability of the product increases and less
information as the initial wealth increases. Furthermore, the decrease cost of insurance
does not necessarily make information more valuable as the value is directly related to
the change in the decisions rather than the cost of taking a specific action.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Decision making is the process of identifying, evaluating and choosing alternatives
based on the preferences of the decision maker and the limitations that arise in the de-
cision environment. Most decisions are made under uncertainty, and information plays
a key role in characterizing the uncertainty in the environment. Gathering information
enables the decision maker to reduce the uncertainty and make better decisions. In
reality, most useful information does not come for free. The decision maker faces a
second decision to make with regard to which information alternative to choose given
his current wealth. In this respect, it is vital to build tools to determine the value of in-
formation a priori and accordingly rank different information based on the underlying
preferences of the decision maker.
Information is a collection of events. The decision maker learns that several events
occur or not before making the decision. In this respect, any incoming information
reduces the size of the outcome space, thus reducing uncertainty. In this study, the
decision maker is assumed to know the actual probability distribution governing the
outcome space. Furthermore, he is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer, using
the actual probability distribution in weighting the possible outcomes. The decision
maker may consider many aspects of consumption in the utility function; however in
this research, we assume that the decision maker cares only about the monetary value
of all items that constitute his total wealth. In other words, the decision maker cares
only about money.
This dissertation follows the style of the IEEE Transactions on Reliability.
2In many engineering models, the decision maker is an expected utility maximizer.
However, the utility function is assumed to be linear in most models. Therefore, the
attitude of the decision maker towards risk is largely ignored for engineering decision
models. This is a big drawback in determining the optimal action in many decision
environments because the degree of risk aversion is critical in the ranking of risky
alternatives. For example, Ohlson [30] shows that information is a risky alternative
and there is no uniform ranking of different information alternatives for each decision
maker. A uniform ranking can be established only if we restrict ourselves to a class of
utility functions. In this respect, most engineering models are solved for a single type
of decision maker, whose attitude towards risk is in reality not very typical of human
nature.
A simple model of decision making can be constructed using simple lotteries and
giving the decision maker the flexibility to choose among two actions: play or not
play. Such a model may not be directly applicable in many decision settings with
an infinitely many number of possible outcomes, however the results from this model
can be generalized as long as the decision maker chooses among two actions. The
computations are relatively straightforward and information can be easily incorporated
in these models. Many investment decisions that a firm faces fit the description of either
a simple lottery or a generalized lottery, but clearly with only two possible actions. A
different lottery is faced after choosing whether to invest or not. The firm may choose
to gather some further information to learn the prospects provided by the investment.
Insurance decisions are similar in that the firm may choose to gather information
about the possible damage. However, depending on the type of insurance contract,
there may be infinitely many possible actions to take. In a coinsurance model, this is
clearly the case as the firm has the flexibility to choose what fraction of the risk to
transfer to the insurance company. In cap-limit insurance models with a deductible,
3the size of the action space depends on the number of alternative contracts provided
by the insurer. In any case, it is important to identify the partition the outcome space
based on optimal actions given a certain outcome. This determines the events that
will give the decision maker the most valuable information to improve the insurance
decision.
Today, as enterprises are expanding to serve global markets, they are exposed to
a variety of operational and hazard risks and are compelled to refine the execution
of their core business. It is neither possible nor profitable to eliminate all the risks,
as the elimination of risks lead to elimination of many rewarding prospects. Rather,
the enterprise should retain risks that are congruent to their core competency and
manage them in an effective manner. Insurance decisions are an important component
of risk management. Physical risks that the facilities are exposed to are among the
most hazardous risks, and their transfer to another party via insurance is vital for the
enterprise. However, some physical risks are low probability events with severe impact
(e.g., the power shutdown that hit North America in 2003), which may be very costly
to insure against. Gathering information reduces uncertainty and helps the enterprises
to choose how much coverage to purchase and how much to pay. We study ranking
of information in insurance decisions and determine what factors affect the value of
information in these decisions.
There are several approaches to evaluate the value of information. Hazen and
Sounderpian [13] shows that there is no agreement between different approaches in
ranking of information alternatives. The expected utility approach measures the value
of information as the difference of expected utility with information and expected utility
without information. This difference is always non-negative because the decision maker
can never be worse off obtaining information in single person decision environments.
This is not the case in decision environments involving multiple decision makers. As in
4Arya et al. [5], and Doherty and Thistle [9], information can have negative value when
there are conflicting objectives of the decision makers and when one party knows that
the other party possesses a piece of information that he may take advantage of. On the
other hand, the selling price approach translates the improvement in expected utility
by acquisition of information to monetary terms. In this respect, there is no preference
reversal between the expected utility and sale price approach. A third approach, which
is particularly useful in pricing information is the buying price approach. It assumes
that the decision maker pays before acquiring information. Preference reversals are
observed between this approach and the other two. The first and essentially the second
approach is preferred for computational ease, hence it is easier to identify the relation
between the value of information and it determinants. It is not possible to obtain a
general closed form expression for the buying price of information. In this document,
we address how and when preference reversals occur and identify the relation between
the value of information and its key determinants.
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II, we review different ap-
proaches to determine the value of information and provide discussion on the previous
literature on the topic. In Chapter III, we analyze the value of information in lotteries
and obtain results on the relation between the value of information and its determi-
nants. In particular we analyze how the degree of risk aversion and the level of initial
wealth affects the value of information in lotteries. In Chapter IV, we first establish
the relation between the expected utility approach and buying price approach. Some
examples to illustrate the preference reversal are provided. Then, we analyze how
the degree of risk aversion affects maximum price that the decision maker accepts for
information. In Chapter V, we visit a choice information problem for insurance deci-
sions. The problem is static in nature, in that the hazard that the decision maker is
exposed to occur at one point in time. We consider ranking of two different classes of
5information alternatives. In Chapter VI, we consider a dynamic enterprise risk man-
agement problem. Two types of risk events hit a facility over time, causing a reduction
in the overall capacity. Reduction of overall capacity exposes the facility to risk of
losing sales. The enterprise considers insurance for such business interruption risk. We
analyze different information alternatives and determine their value to the enterprise
in insurance decisions. Finally, in Chapter VII, we state our concluding remarks and
outline possible research directions.
6CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The concept of information evaluation has been a part of economic and statistical
decision theory for some time. It has long been accepted that decisions made under
uncertainty can be improved (in the sense of higher expected utility) by acquiring infor-
mation. Previous literature concentrated mainly on determination of optimal amount
of information that the decision maker should learn before taking the necessary action.
Additional information might induce the decision maker to update the initial decision
to achieve a higher expected utility. However, not all the useful information may be
available. The selection becomes interesting when one considers the problem with cost
and feasibility concerns.
Three different approaches for including information in decision making have been
considered in the literature. The most popular approach is to obtain data by sampling
a population. Sampling information is valuable when the decision involves some char-
acteristic of a population. The second approach is to gather information in the form of
signals. In this scenario, decision maker can obtain data that serve as a signal about
the actual state of the environment. The final approach is to consider information
as a collection of events. The decision maker determines certain events have actually
occured before taking the action. The mathematical structure that is used to represent
information is a σ-algebra in this case.
The decision maker’s expected utility with no information and with perfect in-
formation are two benchmarks that can be used to evaluate performance with partial
information. The first benchmark measures how well the decision maker does on the
average when he takes a single action in all the possible states, whereas the second one
7measures how much better he could do by eliminating all uncertainty at the decision
epoch. The difference between these two benchmarks represents the expected gain in
utility from knowing exactly which state obtains before the action is taken. Perfect
information gives the opportunity to select the best action in every possible state.
II.1. Quantifying Information for Decision Making under Uncertainty
Consider a probability space (Ω,M, µ). Let A denote a discrete action space and
u : R → R be a utility function. We attribute a single outcome to each action and
state combination. This relation is mathematically represented by a payoff function
p : Ω × A → R. The payoff function maps each state and action combination to a
monetary value as an outcome. The utility function represents the preferences of the
decision maker by assigning a numerical value to each possible outcome. The ranking
of different outcomes by the utility function is inherited from the underlying preference
relation. However, the ranking of risky alternatives requires additional axioms.
Definition 1 A lottery L : Ω→ R is a (Ω,M, µ) measurable random variable with a
distribution function FL(x) = µ◦L−1(x). (i.e., a random variable that maps each risky
alternative to an outcome.)
Let L be the space of lotteries. Following Mas-Colell et al. [24], we assume that
the decision maker has a preference relation, ¹, over L that satisfies the following
axioms:
Axiom of Rationality The preference relation, ¹, is rational if it is both complete
and transitive.
Axiom of Continuity The preference relation, ¹, is continuous if for any L,L′, L′′ ∈
L, the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : αL+ (1− α)L′ º L′′} ⊂ [0, 1] and {α ∈ [0, 1] : αL+ (1−
α)L′ ¹ L′′} ⊂ [0, 1] are closed.
8Axiom of Independence The preference relation, ¹, satisfies the independence ax-
iom if for all L,L′, L′′ ∈ L, and α ∈ (0, 1) we have:
L º L′ if and only if αL+ (1− α)L′′ º αL′ + (1− α)L′′
The independence axiom has been challenged in the literature both theoretically
and experimentally, but we will not pursue such a direction in this research and we
assume this axiom holds. It is a strong axiom that lies in the center of expected utility
theory because it permits the expected utility representation of the preferences over
the lotteries.




The utility function U : L → R has the expected utility form if and only if it
is linear. The expected utility form is preserved by increasing linear transformations.
The decision maker is an expected utility maximizer as his preferences over the lotteries
are represented with a utility in the expected utility form. The following theorem sets
forth this important conclusion.
Theorem 1 (Expected Utility Theorem): Suppose that the rational preference rela-
tion, º, on the space of lotteries L satisfies the continuity and independence axioms.
Then º admits a utility representation of the expected utility form. That is, the fol-
lowing holds:
L º L′ if and only if ∫ u(x)dFL(x) ≥ ∫ u(x)dFL′(x)
Each decision maker would like to choose the action that maximizes utility in each
state. However, without knowledge of the states of world, he can choose only a single
action that will maximize his expected utility over all states. Let a∗ denote the action
taken under this criterion. On the other hand, if the decision maker obtains perfect
9information a priori, he will have the flexibility of choosing the best action in each






Statistical decision theory mainly focuses on information that can be gathered by
sampling. Sampling cost is assumed to be an increasing function of the sample size, so
the optimal sample size has to be chosen. The action is taken after the outcome from
the sample is observed. In this sense, the action is a function of the outcome from the
sample. The decision maker chooses an optimal response to each outcome. Following
Tummala [37] and Raiffa and Schlaifer [32], the problem structure is as follows. Let
k be the sample size, and let Sk be the set of all the outcomes of the sample. We
define Xk : Ω → Sk be the random variable representing the outcome of the sample
of size k. The decision function, dk : Sk → A, extablishes the functional relationship
between the outcome of the sample and the action taken. Let Dk denote the space of
decision functions when the sample size is k and Vk : Ω×Dk→ R be the expected value
function. When the decision function d¯ ∈ Dk is chosen, the expected value of sampling
in state ω is given by
Vk(ω, d¯) =
∫
u(p(ω, d¯(s))) dP (s|ω)
where P (s|ω) is the probability of a sample outcome of s given the actual state ω.
Since the decision maker does not know the actual state, he computes the expected




Define d∗k = argmaxd∈DkEVk(d), where E denotes the expectation operator. Then
10
the expected value of sampling with sample size of k is,
EVSI(k) = EVk(d∗k)−
∫
u(p(ω, a∗)) dµ(ω)− ck
where ck denotes the fixed cost of sampling of size k. The optimal sample size is found
by maximizing EVSI(k) over k.
So-called information systems are another form of modeling information acquisi-
tion. They are a collection of potential signals that can be observed in the environment.
The decision maker observes signals before making the decision. These signals are out-
comes of some random variables. Suppose that the decision maker considers purchasing
information system I = {I1, ..., In} where Ii is a random variable that is available for
observation under information system I. Information systems have been studied by
Marschak and Radner [23], Marschak and Miyasawa [22], Gjesdal [11], Miller [28] and
many others. The generally accepted definition of the value of information system I is
EV (I) = E [maxa∈AIE [u(p(ω, a))|I]]− E [u(p(ω, a∗))]− cI
where cI is the fixed cost of information system I and AI is the set of feasible actions
under information system I that the decision maker has the flexibility to take at
the time of making the decision. It can be observed that the approach to measure
the value of information is similar to the previous one in that expected a priori gain
from purchasing information should exceed expected gain without information plus
the cost of information. The value of information is determined by the utility of the
decision maker, flexibility in taking action, feasibility of an action with respect to the
information system, the probability law that governs the states of the world, initial
level of wealth and the cost of obtaining information.
The third approach to measure the value of information has been formalized in
the context of general equilibrium in economic theory. Radner [31] incorporated un-
11
certainty in the general equilibrium model developed by Arrow [4] and Debreu [8] in
that he considered different economic agents with different information. He considered
information as a collection events represented mathematically by a σ-algebra. Allen [1]
studied the mathematical properties of these information structures and showed that
the value of information mapping is continuous with respect to the Hausdorff met-
ric on σ-algebras. Furthermore, Allen [2] treated information as a commodity with a
given price and formulated the problem of information acquisition. A dynamic model
for information acquisition is offered in Allen [3], where the firms treat R&D opera-
tions as information acquision activities with uncertainty incorporated regarding the
consequence of R&D investment. Following her notation, we describe the problem as
follows: Consider a complete probability space (Ω,M, µ). An information bundle is
a sub-σ-field of M. The set of all complete sub-σ-fields of M is denoted as M∗. In
Allen’s model, U ={v ∈ C0(Rl+,R): v is strictly monotone and strictly concave}; i.e.,
U is the basic set of continuous utility functions.
Definition 3 The initial endowment, e ∈ Rl++, is the amount of commodities that a
decision maker owns before trade.
Let ∆ = {q ∈ Rl++|Σlj=1|qj| = 1} be the (l − 1)-dimensional open unit simplex in
Rl. The initial endowment is a non-zero vector. Allen defined the value of information
as [1],
Definition 4 If U : Ω → U (where there is a compact K ⊂ U such that U(ω) ∈ K
µ-a.s.), e ∈ Rl++ and q ∈ ∆, define the value (in utility terms) of the information
provided by sub-σ-field G of M to be,
V (G;U, e, p) = max{∫
Ω
u(p(ω, a(ω)))dµ(ω)|a : Ω→ Rl+
is G-measurable and q · a(ω) ≤ q · e µ-a.s.}
− max{∫
Ω
u(p(ω, a(ω)))dµ(ω)|a : Ω→ Rl+
12
is constant and satisfies q · a(ω) ≤ q · e}
where the utility function is state dependent.
Essentially, the second and third approaches derive from statistical decision theory.
One can observe that all three approaches are Bayesian in nature as the decision maker
updates the probability distribution on the states of the world after obtaining infor-
mation. Another quick observation is to make an immediate connection between the
second and third approaches. The conditional expectation with respect to a collection
of signals is the same as conditional expectation with respect to σ-algebra generated by
the random variables which generate those signals. In this document, we consider in-
formation as collection of events, hence the third approach will be employed to measure
the value of information in what follows.
II.1.1. Comparison of Information Bundles
It is important to be able to compare different information bundles. Several dif-
ferent approaches have been taken in the literature. One approach is to compare
information bundles by a notion of distance in a metric space. In this approach,M∗ is
treated as a metric space and several equivalent metrics are used to define a topology.
This sort of mathematical structure is particularly useful to address the questions of
convergence of information bundles. Let F and G be two elements in M∗. Boylan [6]
proposed the following metric:
d1(F ,G) = supF∈F infG∈Gµ(F∆G) + supG∈GinfF∈Fµ(F∆G)
This metric involves two pieces assuming symmetric interpretations. Note that,
µ(F∆G) piece is itself a metric on the space ofM where each element ofM is an event.
Extending the notion of using probability on the symmetric difference between two sets
as a measure of distance between two events, two pieces of the metric are obtained. The
first term in the expression for d1(F ,G) measures how closely G resembles F and the
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second term measures how closely F resembles G. Rogge [33] formulated an equivalent
metric by using the conditional expectations operator E[·|F ] as follows
d2(F ,G) = supf∈Θ‖E[f |F ]−E[f |G]‖1
where Θ is the set of all M-measurable functions.
A third metric is defined by Van Zandt [38] in a separable metric space (X, d),
in which the M-measurable functions take value. Let θ(f, g) = inf {ε > 0|µ{ω ∈
Ω | d(f(ω), g(ω)) > ε} < ε} be a metric which induces a notion of convergence in mea-
sure and generates a topology on the equivalence classes of M-measurable functions.
This metric is a distance between two M-measurable functions in that they are close
if they don’t differ much except on a subset of Ω with an insignificant measure. The
Hausdorff distance between two information bundles is also characterized by comparing
their respective measurable actions as follows:
d3(F ,G) =max{supf∈MF infg∈MGθ(f, g),supg∈MG inff∈MFθ(f, g)}
where MF and MG are the sets of F and G measurable functions respectively. This
metric establishes a nice connection between two information bundles. The additional
value that each information bundle provides to the decision-maker is an enlarged set
of feasible policies. The equivalence of the last metric says that if two bundles give
information about very similar events, then the feasible policies are also similar.
These metrics have been studied extensively by Boylan [6], Rogge [33], Landers
and Rogge [20] and Van Zandt [38]. Rogge showed that d1(F ,G) ≤ d2(F ,G). Landers
and Rogge established the equivalence between these two metrics and showed that
d2(F ,G) ≤ 8d1(F ,G). Van Zandt extended the equivalence result and showed that the
first and the third metrics are equivalent.
Theorem 2 Van Zandt ([38], 1993): min{diam(X, d)/2, d1(F ,G)} ≤ d3(F ,G) ≤ 4d1(F ,G).
This equivalence relation makes the connection between similarity of information
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bundles and the similarity of informationally feasible decision rules. Each element of
MF can be interpreted as an informationally feasible policy given F . The additional
value that each information bundle provides to the decision maker is an enlarged set of
feasible policies. The equivalence of d1(F ,G) and d3(F ,G) says that if two bundles give
information about very similar events, then the feasible policies are also very similar.
The decision maker is restricted with the amount of information he has when he chooses
among the set of feasible policies. It is not possible to implement a complex policy with
very restricted information as the information bundle does not form a nice partition of
the state space. In the case of no information, F = {Ω, ∅}, the set of feasible policies
are only the constant functions. On the other hand, when the decision maker can
observe full information about the states of the world, he can follow the best policy in
any state. This full information case is captured in EVPI.
Similar strategies can be implemented under similar information bundles. This
will be very useful in modeling the choice of information in that the decision maker
may be able to substitute an information bundle with something similar enough when
financial limitations arise. In a dynamic situation where information packages can be
mathematically viewed as a filtration, {Ft}t≥0, increasing to a σ-field F∞, Boylan [6]
showed the following:
Theorem 3 Boylan ([6], 1971): Let Ft, t = 1, 2, ...,∞ be subfields of F with Ft in-
creasing or decreasing to F∞ and limt→∞ d1(Ft,F∞) = 0. Then the functions E[f |Ft],
t = 1, 2, ..., such that ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1 are strongly equiconvergent.
Theorem 4 Boylan ([6], 1971): Let Ft, t = 1, 2, ..., be a sequence of subfields with
the property that lims,t→∞d1(Fs,Ft) = 0. Then there exists a subfield H such that
limt→∞d1(Ft,H) = 0. Moreover, for every f integrable, E[f |Ft] converges in measure
to E[f |H].
Therefore, it can be suggested that after some point in time implementation of
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some strategy will be very similar as we get more information. Accordingly, the deci-
sion maker can stop gathering information after some time for cost saving purposes.
However, if there are some extreme events with financially severe consequences, the
decision maker may assume the risk of facing an extreme event without any prior de-
tection after stopping to gather information. In this respect, the time to stop gathering
information depends on the degree of risk aversion of the decision maker.
Allen [1] shows the following continuity results,
Theorem 5 Allen ([1], 1983): If U , e and p are as in the definition above and if
Gn → G in the metric topology of F∗ = {space of equivalence classes of sub-σ fields of
F with respect to the metric d1 }, then V (Gn;U, e, p)→ V (G;U, e, p).
Corollary 1 Allen ([1], 1983): If {Un} is a sequence of measurable functions defined
on Ω such that Un → U in U topology (pointwise) on a subset Ω of measure one and
{Un} sequence is uniformly bounded, if en → e ∈ Rl++, if pn → p ∈ ∆ and if Gn → G
in the F∗ topology, then V (Gn;U, e, p)→ V (G;U, e, p).
This continuity result was extended by Van Zandt [38].
Corollary 2 Van Zandt ([38], 1993): The value of information map is uniformly con-
tinuous with respect to the Hausdorff metric d1.
These results suggest that similar information bundles are also close in value for
a decision maker. Thus, if the decision maker acquires an information bundle that
consists of similar events with some target information bundle that is not available,
then he can expect a similar performance of his decision. This fact has practical im-
portance because in reality information sources are limited and decisions are usually
made missing critical information. The continuity result holds for any decision maker,
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however it does not guarantee identical ranking of two information bundles for differ-
ent decision makers given that they are sufficiently similar (i.e., decision makers with
different utility functions and/or initial wealth levels).
II.1.2. Information Pricing
The difference in expected utilities provides a good benchmark to evaluate the
value of information. However, it does not address the question of how much a decision
maker is willing to pay for the information when the utility function is not separable
in the cost of information. The question of information pricing has been thoroughly
studied by LaValle [17] [18] [19]. His model is important as it provides a nice connection
between the shape of the utility function and the value of information. The relation
between risk taking behavior and the price that the decision maker is willing to pay
for information is established. Roughly speaking, information bundles with higher
prices rank higher in preference ordering of the decision maker. In his model, p :
Ω × A → R similarly defines the state and action dependent payoff. The cost of
obtaining information is also state dependent, cF : Ω→ R. The utility function ranks
payoffs, u : R → R. Let a∗ = argmaxa∈A E[u(p(ω, a) + y)]. Then, a∗ is the optimal
action without any information. LaValle defined two different prices for information,
one for the seller side, one for the buyer side.
Definition 5 The certainty equivalent, c(L, u), of the lottery L is the amount of money
for which the decision maker is indifferent between the sure outcome c(L, u) and the
lottery L; that is, u(c(L, u)) = EU where EU is the expected utility from the lottery.
Definition 6 LaValle ([17], 1968): The seller price of information bundle F with
initial endowment y and cost function cF is the unique number S[F , y, cF ] defined by,
u(y + S[F , y, cF ]) = E[maxa∈AFE[u(p(ω, a) + y − cF(ω))|F ]]
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Definition 7 LaValle ([17], 1968): The buyer price of information bundle F with
initial endowment y and cost function cF is the unique number B[F , y, cF ] defined by,
u(y) = E[maxa∈AFE[u(p(ω, a) + y − cF(ω)−B[F , y, cF ])|F ]]
where AF denotes the actions which are F -measurable. The seller price is the maximum
amount of additional wealth that the decision maker is willing to forgo for purchasing
information bundle F . It is the difference between the certainty equivalent of the
risky information gathering activity and the current level of wealth. On the other
hand, the buyer price is the maximum amount of additional cost that the information
bundle could have in order to make the investment equally desirable with today’s asset
position. They don’t have be equal. Both can be negative. LaValle shows that the
following relation holds:
Theorem 6 LaValle ([17], 1968):
(1) S[F , y, cF ] = B[F , y + S[F , y, cF ], cF ]
(2) B[F , y, cF ] = S[F , y −B[F , y, cF ], cF ]
The first equality suggests that the amount of money required to forgo the decision
to purchase information should be the same as the amount of increase in the cost of
information that makes the decision maker indifferent between purchasing the informa-
tion and the new asset position. The second equality has the converse implication. It
suggests that the amount of increase in the cost of information that makes the decision
maker indifferent between purchasing the information and the original asset position
is the same as the amount that the decision maker requires to forgo the purchase of
information in the new reduced asset position. LaValle calculates the prices in lotteries
where there is one action in each lottery. However, in simple lotteries, the decision
maker always has the flexibility to skip the lottery, and this will affect the functional
form of the prices of the lotteries.
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II.2. Determinants of the Value of Information and Ranking of Information
Bundles
Since the utility functions of different individuals may be dissimilar, ranking of
information bundles in terms of preference could be quite different. However, it is
possible to come up with a common preference ordering on information bundles if
we restrict ourselves to a certain collection of utility functions. Ohlson [30] showed
that there exists a common ranking of information bundles in a portfolio selection
problem if the probabilities of returns are “small risk”. The implication behind this is
that moments of degrees greater than two can be neglected. When returns have “small
risk” probabilities, Samuelson [35] showed that the mean-variance approach in financial
analysis is justified within the theory of expected utility in that the mean-variance
approach produces consistent results with the axioms of expected utility maximization.
This allows Markowitz [21] type of portfolio selection analysis possible, and Ohlson’s
results on optimal portfolio mix turn out to be independent of the particular utility
function and the initial wealth.
As shown in Hilton [14] and Gould [12], the value of information does not in
general have a monotonic relationship with any of its determinants: action flexibility,
risk aversion, initial wealth and the degree of uncertainty. However, LaValle [17] and
Willinger [39] obtained monotonicity and invariance results with respect to one of the
determinants for a restricted class of utility functions and a particular class of decision
settings. Under certain assumptions, Merkhofer [27] performed sensitivity analysis of
the value of information with respect to different decision parameters, given action
flexibility for quadratic utility functions. Such relationships are very useful especially
for a rich class of engineering problems where the utility function of the decision maker
is generally not known with certainty. For example, in reliability problems, several
different and relevant objective functions are used for very similar decision settings.
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Accordingly, the ranking of information bundles could depend on the objective function
used unless some general form of relationship or a preference ranking is verified.
Preference ranking reversals are possible when we use different approaches to quan-
tify information value. Hazen and Sounderpian [13] showed that the selling prices and
difference in expected utility are ordinally equivalent measures of information value
whereas the buying prices may offer preference ranking reversals. The buying price
has practical significance in that it measures how much a decision maker is willing to
pay to purchase information. The difference in expected utility approach illustrates
how much the decision maker is expected to be better off by incorporating more infor-
mation. In this document, we show when the preference reversals occur and discuss the
potential causes for preference reversals. We analyze a simple lottery for this purpose
as it is the basic building block of decision making under uncertainty, and it helps us
develop an approach for modeling risky alternatives in an easy and concise manner.
Every decision making problem with finite number of risky outcomes can be reduced
to a simple lottery. Furthermore, the results on simple lotteries can easily be extended
to decision settings where the outcomes are realized as a value of a continuous variable.
Intuitively, increase in the degree of risk aversion leads to an increase in the value
of information. The reason behind this is that elimination of uncertainty to some
extend should be valued more by the risk averse decision maker. However, this line of
reasoning ignores the fact that information gathering is itself a risky activity, as the
decision maker does not know what the exact information he will learn in advance. In
this study, the relation between the value of information and degree of risk aversion is
established in simple lotteries under different circumstances.
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II.3. Applications of Information Valuation in the Operations Research
Literature
The operations research models generally address the impact of information on
decision making either through consideration of perfect information or realization of
random variables. Howard [15] [16], considered a decision maker assuming partial infor-
mation through observation of a random variable that has a direct impact on expected
utility. Mehrez and Sethi [25] and Mehrez and Stulman [26] considered information
purchasing in project selection problem. Their model offers a fixed information system
available for each project, and they did not consider different information alternatives
for each possible project. Recently, C¸etin, Jarrow, Protter, Yıldırım [7] studied a credit
risk model under partial information where they consider information as a collection of
events. There seems to be a promising path for research for enrichment of operations
research models with incorporation of different information structures.
In many operations research models, choice of information bundles among many
alternatives has not been addressed. Generally, there are two approaches to incorporate
information. One, generally appearing in supply-chain literature, models a contractual
relationship between two parties with conflicting objectives and asymmetric informa-
tion. The value of information is realized through improved performance of contracts
via information sharing. The second, as we discussed above, focuses on the question of
acquisition of single information bundle or as in filtering theory collection of informa-
tion bundles that is dynamically enriched over time, without any significant interest to
determine the best among several different information sources.
II.4. Value of Information in Insurance Decisions
Insurance is one of the well known mechanisms to transfer risk between two de-
cision makers. Insurance decisions are usually made under asymmetric information
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conditions. Most of the earlier work on the impact of information on insurance de-
cisions has focused on design of insurance contracts under asymmetric information.
Rothschild and Stiglitz [34], Wilson [40], Miyazaki [29], Spence [36] and others have
characterized the equilibrium contracts in insurance markets and analyzed the effect of
adverse selection on equilibrium. The value of information is not necessarily positive
in decision settings that involve more than one decision maker. Doherty and Thistle
[9] showed that the insured benefits from acquiring information as long as it is not also
observed by the insurer. Such information can be used to the advantage of the insured
as the insurer cannot adjust his action in light of this information.
The earlier work does not address the question of what information should be
purchased to improve insurance decisions. In the following chapters, the ranking of a
certain class of information bundles is established for a decision maker with a specific
utility function and the factors that affect the value of information is analyzed. Further,
the relation between the amount of coinsurance and the type of information purchased
is illustrated. This problem arises in every industry that faces risk of business inter-
ruption due to physical risk events. The firm can benefit from collecting information
about the intensity of risk events and the severity of risk events. It is important to
determine the the desirable information bundle that will facilitate and improve the
insurance decisions against business interruption risks given cost considerations. To
this end, a simple risk model is considered and the value of information in business
interruption risk problems is analyzed.
22
CHAPTER III
VALUE OF INFORMATION IN LOTTERIES
We consider a lottery setting where the decision maker has to decide whether to
play or not. The lottery has prospects of monetary outcomes either positive or negative
that the decision maker has to accept. If the decision maker chooses not to play, then
there is neither a monetary gain nor a loss. The decision maker is an expected utility
maximizer. In this work, we restrict the available information bundles to certain forms
of events. The information about the events is made available by a mediator. Both the
mediator and the decision maker are assumed to know the probability distribution on
the outcomes. Initially, the mediator conveys the information about the true probabil-
ity distribution and provides some choices of information bundles that are available to
the gambler. We wish to see which information bundles are desirable for the gambler.
III.1. Value of Information
Consider a random variable L with a discrete probability law and a finite number
of outcomes. This is a typical lottery situation, where the possible actions are either
”play” or ”skip” the lottery.
Definition 8 A simple lottery, L : Ω → R, is a real valued random variable with a
finite number of outcomes and a discrete probability law.
The decision maker plays the lottery if the expected utility from playing is greater
than utility of skipping the lottery. The number of possible outcomes of the lottery
is n. The initial wealth of the decision maker is denoted by W . Let Π = (pi1, ..., pin)
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denote the vector of outcomes 1 with F = (p1, ..., pn) as the probability distribution
over the outcomes (i.e., pi = µ(pii)). Furthermore, let p(pi, a) be the payoff to the
decision maker when action a is taken and outcome pi from the lottery is observed.
Note that, p(pi, ”skip”) = 0 and p(pi, ”play”) = pi for all pi ∈ Π. Suppose the lottery
owner provides information about events of the form Ei , where Ei = {outcome pii
occurs}. This particular form of events induces a simple partitioning of the outcome
space into two. Accordingly, the decision maker learns a priori whether Ei occurs
or not. This gives the flexibility of reconsidering the original decision on the basis
of incoming information. Since the value of information is computed a priori, the
maximum expected utility obtained in each event is weighed by their probability of
occurance. Let EU denote the expected utility earned playing the lottery. We wish to
determine the value of information regarding Ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The value of information
is simply calculated by,
EUi = P (Ei) ·max{0,E[u(p(pi, ”play”))|Ei]}+
P (Eci ) ·max{0,E[u(p(pi,”play”))|Eci ]} −max{0,EU} (3.1)
It is easy to see that the value of information, 3.1, is nonnegative. The deci-
sion maker is never worse off by obtaining more information. We will first obtain an
expression for EUi for a risk neutral decision maker and then generalize the result.
III.1.1. Risk Neutral Decision Maker
Assume the decision maker has a linear utility function of the form u(x) = ax+ b,
a > 0. Linear utility functions are used to model the preferences of a risk neutral
decision maker. The following proposition yields a simplified expression for EUi when
1The underlying probability space is (Π,F , µ). F is a σ-algebra generated by dis-
crete events and µ is a disrete probability distribution.
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the decision maker is risk neutral.
Proposition 1 For a risk neutral decision maker,
EUi =
 |apiipi| : (EU− b) · pii < 0max (0, |apiipi| − |EU− b|) : (EU− b) · pii ≥ 0
Proof: First, E[u(p(pi, ”play”))|Ei] = apii+b and E[u(p(pi, ”play”))|Eci ] = EU−(apii+b)·pi1−pi .
Then substituting these, the expression becomes
EUi = pi ·max {b, apii + b}+ (1− pi) ·max {b, EU− (apii + b) · pi
1− pi } −max {b,EU}
= max {pi · b, (apii + b) · pi}+max {(1− pi) · b,EU− (apii + b) · pi} −max {b,EU}.
We have four cases to consider.
Case-1: If (EU− b) < 0, pii > 0, then EUi = apiipi.
Case-2: If (EU− b) ≤ 0, pii < 0, then EUi =max{0,EU− b− apiipi}.
Case-3: If (EU− b) ≥ 0, pii > 0, then EUi =max{0, apiipi + b− EU}.
Case-4: If (EU− b) > 0, pii < 0, then EUi = −apiipi.
These cases can be combined easily to obtain the result. ¤
The proposition states that obtaining information about any outcome which in-
duces the decision maker change his decision is valuable. If we assume that the lottery
is not worth playing in the no information case, one is expected to be better off with
a piece of information about any positive outcome. This is intuitive because the deci-
sion maker has the opportunity to change the optimal action after observing a positive
outcome. In such a case, the second piece of the argument says that the information
about a negative outcome pii might have positive value either when it is highly likely to
occur or when its payoff is significantly high in absolute value. Note that the decision
maker updates the original decision in case such an event does not occur. The contri-
bution pii · pi of such an outcome to the expected utility with no information should be
dominant so that the sign of the expected utility changes when such an outcome fails
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to occur. The level of initial wealth has no impact on the value of information.
III.1.2. Decision Maker with a General Utility Function
An analogous expression can be derived for any utility function. In the general
case, U = (u1, ..., un) denotes the utility gained in each of the n outcomes, i.e., ui =
u(W + pii). Similarly, u0 = u(W ) denotes the utility of skipping the lottery.
Proposition 2 For a decision maker with a strictly increasing utility function,
EUi =
 |(ui − u0) · pi| : (EU− u0) · pii < 0max (0, |(ui − u0) · pi| − |EU− u0|) : (EU− u0) · pii ≥ 0
Proof: As in Proposition 1, one can obtain an analogous expression for EUi.
EUi = max {u0 · pi, ui · pi}+ max {u0 · (1− pi),EU− ui · pi} − max {u0,EU} (3.2)
Similarly, there are four cases to consider in 3.2
Case-1: If EU < u0, pii > 0, then EUi = pi · (ui − u0)
Case-2: If EU ≤ u0, pii ≤ 0, then EUi =max{0,EU− pi · (ui − u0)− u0}
Case-3: If EU ≥ u0, pii ≥ 0, then EUi =max{0, u0 − pi · (u0 − ui)− EU}
Case-4: If EU > u0, pii < 0, then EUi = pi · (u0 − ui)
One can combine these cases to obtain the final result. ¤
Comparison of the value of specific information about a single state is possible
with Proposition 2 for the general case where we have a risk averse decision maker.
Obtaining information about a single state alters the optimal action on at most one
possible occasion. The optimal action taken after assuming the information about
outcome i is an Fi-measurable function where Fi is the σ-algebra generated by Ei.
With richer information bundles, it is possible to improve the expected gains from
playing the lottery.
The decision maker is never worse off learning whether multiple events of the sort
26
Ei have occured or not. However, as the following proposition states, there are cases
where obtaining finer information bundles does not improve the expected utility of
the decision maker. We reach this conclusion by making a comparison between the
information bundles generated by Em = {pi1, ..., pim} and {pi1},...,{pim} where m ≤
n. Let Fm = σ(Em) and Fˆm = σ(E1, ..., Em). We denote the value of information
conveyed by a σ-algebra, F , by EU[F ]. Then
EU[Fm] = (p1 + ...+ pm) ·max (u0, (u1 · p1 + ...+ um · pm)/(p1 + ...+ pm))+
(1 − p1 − ... − pm) · max (u0, (EU − u1 · p1 − ... − um)/(1 − p1 − ... −
pm))−max (u0,EU)
= max (u0 · {p1 + ...+ pm}, u1 · p1 + ...+ um · pm)+
max (u0 ·{1−p1−...−pm},EU−u1 ·p1−...−um)−max (u0,EU)
Similarly,
EU[Fˆm] = p1 ·max (u0, u1) + ...+ pm ·max (u0, um)+
(1 − p1 − ... − pm) · max (u0, (EU − u1 · p1 − ... − um)/(1 − p1 − ... −
pm))−max (u0,EU).
Hence, the improvement in the value of information from obtaining precise information
about whether each outcome i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m has occured or not is as follows,
∆Fm = EU[Fˆm]− EU[Fm] = p1· max (u0, u1) + ...+ pm· max (u0, um)−
max (u0 · {p1 + ...+ pm}, u1 · p1 + ...+ um · pm).
Proposition 3
∆Fm =
 0 : ∃ no i, j ≤ m s.t. pii · pij < 0> 0 : o.w.
Proof: There are two cases to consider for the first equality. We will give a proof for
the case where pii ≥ 0, and the proof for the case with pii < 0 follows similarly. Since
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pii ≥ 0, ui ≥ u0 ∀i s.t. 0 ≤ i ≤ m. Then
max (u0 · {p1 + ...+ pm}, u1 · p1 + ...+ um · pm) = u1 · p1 + ...+ um · pm
p1 ·max (u0, u1) + ...+ pm ·max (u0, um) = u1 · p1 + ...+ um · pm
Hence, the result follows. Now, assume that ∃ i, j s.t. pii · pij < 0 and wlog pii > 0.
Then ui > u0 and uj < u0. Hence
∆Fm = ui ·pi+u0 ·pj+
∑m
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III.1.3. Evaluation of Information on the Range of the Outcome
Suppose that we enumerate the n outcomes such that pii < pij for i < j. In
this section, we would like to compare information bundles generated by the events
of the form E≤m = {pi1, ..., pim}. In other words, the decision maker is allowed to ask
the question, “Is the outcome less than or equal to pim?”. The value of information
conveyed by such an event is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Let F≤m be the information bundle generated by E≤m. Then, for a
decision maker with a general utility function
EU[F≤m] =
 max (0, (EU− u0)−
∑
i≤m(ui − u0) · pi) : EU < u0
max (0,
∑
i≤m(u0 − ui) · pi) : EU ≥ u0
Proof: The computation proceeds as follows




= max (u0 · (p1 + ...+ pm), u1 · p1 + ...+ um · pm)+
max (u0 · (1− p1 − ...− pm),EU− u1 · p1 − ...− um · pm)
− max (u0,EU)
Case 1: If EU < u0,
EU[F≤m] = u0 · (p1 + ...+ pm − 1)+
max (u0 · (1− p1 − ...− pm),EU− u1 · p1 − ...− um · pm)
= max (0, (EU− u0)− (u1 − u0) · p1 − ...− (um − u0) · pm)
Case 2: If EU ≥ u0,
EU[F≤m] = max (u0 · (p1 + ...+ pm), u1 · p1 + ...+ um · pm)
+EU− u1 · p1 − ...− um · pm − EU.
= max ((u0 − u1) · p1 + ...+ (u0 − um) · pm, 0)
¤
The decision maker should ask the right question to maximize his expected utility
before obtaining the information. The value of information is maximized at m that
offers the maximum payoff among negative outcomes. This is shown in the following
corollary.
Corollary 3 EU[F≤m] is maximized at the value of m∗ such that pim∗ = max {pii :
pii ≤ 0 and pii+1 > 0}.
Proof: First, suppose that EU < u0,
EU[F≤m] = max (0, (EU− u0)−
∑
i≤m
(ui − u0) · pi). (3.3)
Since for each i such that pii ≤ 0, ui ≤ u0, 3.3 is maximized by involving all the negative
outcomes. Similar observation for the opposite case leads to the desired conclusion. ¤
In this lottery setting, one does not have to know explicitly which outcomes have
occured if the payoff in those states are all positive or negative. The action space of
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the decision maker involves only two actions which suggests in the light of Proposition
3 that he cares only about learning whether the payoff is positive or negative. Ac-
cordingly, a direct result of Proposition 3 is the existence of some information bundle
generated by a single event that has exactly the same value as the information bun-
dle which reveals perfect information about the states of the world before decision is
made. Furthermore, this event does not have to induce a partition of the outcome space
that is payoff adequate. The only payoff adequate partition of the outcome space is
the information bundle that provides perfect information. However, obtaining perfect
information may be a very costly activity. In this regard, it is important to realize
that the decision maker does not have to obtain perfect information. We know that
EV PI =
∑
{pii|pii>0} pi · ui + u0 ·
∑
{pii|pii<0} pi.
Corollary 4 EU[F≤m∗ ] = EV PI.
Proof: Let Fp = σ({pii}|pii > 0). By Proposition 3, EU[Fp] = EU[F≤m∗ ]. It is clear
that:
EU[Fp] =∑{pii|pii>0} pi · ui + u0 ·∑{pii|pii<0} pi.
which is equal to EV PI. ¤
Hence, information about E≤m
∗
does not only offer the maximum expected utility
among the class of information bundles generated by events of the form E≤m, but also
among the class of all possible information bundles. A similar result can obtained in
the case of finite action and finite outcome space without any difficulty. To see this,
let A = {a1, ..., ak} be the finite action space and ui,j be the utility earned when pii is
observed and action aj is taken. Next, define A
i = {pis : us,i =argmaxaj∈Aus,j}. Then


















ps argmaxaj∈Aus,j − EU
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= EV PI
In the general case, it is not possible to find a single event that will yield the same
value as the perfect information. The decision maker’s objective should be to gather
information about events on which a single action is optimal. Intuitively, there is no
gains in learning the exact outcome in an event which induces a single action. If the
decision maker asks the right questions, then he can avoid the costs of obtaining very
precise information.
III.2. Risk Aversion and Ranking of Information
The decision maker’s utility function is an important determinant of the value of
information. The shape of the utility function describes the degree of risk aversion. As
shown in Gould [12] and Hilton [14], there is no general monotonic relation between the
value of information and risk taking behavior of the decision maker. This conclusion
does not preclude any monotonic relation that holds for a particular class of decision
makers or probability distributions. Ohlson [30] and Willinger [39] showed such a
relation holds if the probability distribution is small risk in the sense of Samuelson
[35].
We show below that there is a monotonic relation between the degree of risk
aversion and the ranking of the information bundles Fi, if we limit the class of utility
functions. We consider two decision makers with strictly concave utility functions u
and v. In what follows, v displays a lower degree of absolute risk aversion than u. The
degree of absolute risk aversion is measured by ru(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x). We also let EU
and EV denote the expected utility earned playing the lottery from decision makers
with utility functions u and v respectively.
Proposition 5 Let u and v be strictly concave and increasing utility functions with
rv(x) ≤ ru(x) and pii and pij be two outcomes s.t. pii > pij. Suppose that u and v satisfy
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either one of the conditions below,
(i) (EU−u0) ·pii < 0, (EU−u0) ·pij < 0, (EV− v0) ·pii < 0 and (EV− v0) ·pij < 0,
(ii) (EU−u0) ·pii ≥ 0, (EU−u0) ·pij ≥ 0, (EV−v0) ·pii ≥ 0 and (EV−v0) ·pij ≥ 0,
Then if u ranks information on outcome pii above information on outcome pij, v forms
the same ranking between pii and pij.
Proof: Note that under both conditions, we have pii · pij > 0. Under (i), we know
from Proposition 2 that the information about outcome i has higher value than the
information about outcome j if |(ui − u0) · pi| > |(uj − u0) · pj|. This condition can be
rewritten as
u(W + pii)− u(W )




Since rv(x) ≤ ru(x), there exists an increasing concave function ψ such that u(x) =
ψ(v(x)) (see [24]). By concavity and since pii > pij, we have
v(W + pii)− v(W )
v(W + pij)− v(W ) ≥
ψ(v(W + pii))− ψ(v(W ))




The desired conclusion follows from here.
Now, under (ii), we retain the relation pii · pij > 0. First, assume that both pii
and pij are positive. Then EU ≥ u0 and EV ≥ v0 holds. By Proposition 2, the
information bundle Fi is more valuable than Fj if max(0, (ui − u0) · pi − (EU− u0)) ≥
max (0, (uj − u0) · pj − (EU− u0)). This condition is exactly the same as the condition
in the first case, so the result follows. Finally, we assume that both pii and pij are
negative. This clearly implies that EU < u0 and EV < v0, and using exactly the same
condition as in the first assumption, we can show that the result follows. ¤
This proposition derives the conditions under which we can make any comparison
between the preference ranking of different information bundles among decision makers
with various attitudes towards risk. However, the postulated assumptions are restric-
tive and the proposition provides comparison among a limited class of decision makers.
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This is an indication of a lack of relation between the degree of risk aversion and the
value of information even when we would like to compare a small class of information
bundles. Intuitively, it is possible to form an opinion in favor of higher demand for
information when the decision maker is more risk averse. However, we are considering
the value of information a priori. Therefore, there is always some risk inherent in the
process of gathering of information. As we have incorporated in our analysis, making
the decision in the light of an information bundle may not induce a change in inital
decision in many cases. It may even be true that the decision maker decides to change
his initial action with knowledge about one low probability event only in case that one
event with a low probability occurs. This scenario poses a risk of getting valueless
information, hence the decision maker with a higher degree of risk aversion may value
this information bundle very poorly a priori despite the fact that learning one of the
events in the partition may save him from drastic consequences.
For a more restricted class of utility functions, it is possible to reach similar con-
clusions in other cases, too. We demonstrate this with an example.
III.2.1. An Example to Rank Information Bundles
Let’s assume that the decision maker has the utility function ur(x) = −e−r·x. A
nice property of this family of utility functions is that r is the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. Suppose that there are two decision makers with utility functions ua
and ub where a ≥ b. Furthermore, consider the case where (EU − u0) · pii < 0 and
(EU − u0) · pij ≥ 0, i.e., both ua and ub satisfies these two conditions. Retaining the
assumption that pii > pij, we know from Proposition 2 that Fi is valued more than Fj
if |(ui− u0) · pi| ≥ max (0, |(uj − u0) · pj| − |EU− u0|). Note that, pii · pij < 0 under the




u0 − uj ≥
pj
pi
− u0 − EU
pi · (u0 − uj) .
By the concavity of the utility functions, we may deduce that
ub(W + pii)− ub(W )
ub(W )− ub(W + pij) ≥
ua(W + pii)− ua(W )
ua(W )− ua(W + pij) .
We need to see how (u0−EU)/(pi · (u0−uj)) behaves as the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion, r, increases
u0 − EU
pi · (u0 − uj) =
−1 +∑nk=1pk · exp(−r · pik)
−1 + exp(−r · pij) (3.4)





(−∑nk=1 pik · pk · exp(−r · pik)) · (−1 + exp(−r · pij))
(−1 + exp(−r · pij))2 +
pij · exp(−r · pij) · (−1 +
∑n
k=1 pk · exp(−r · pik))
(−1 + exp(−r · pij))2 . (3.5)
From the conditions given, we obtain −1 +∑nk=1 pk · exp (−r · pik) ≥ 0 and −1 +
exp (−r ·pij) ≥ 0. Since pij ≤ 0, pij · exp (−r ·pij) ≤ 0. The sign of 3.5 will be negative
if
∑n









pi2k · pk · exp(−r · pik) < 0
Hence, this term is monotonically decreasing in r. Furthermore∑n
k=1 pik · pk · exp(−r · pik)|r=0 =
∑n
k=1 pik · pk = E[outcome from the lottery].
Hence, if the expected outcome from the lottery is positive, we can arrive a similar
conclusion as in Proposition 5 as long as a, b ∈ [0, r¯], where r¯ satisfies∑n
k=1 pik · pk · exp(−r · pik)|r=r¯ = 0.
Otherwise, we cannot arrive at a certain conclusion.
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This example illustrates the difficulty in claiming certain conclusions between the
degree of risk aversion and ranking of information. The nature of the lottery and the
utility functions has a non monotonic impact on the preference rankings of decision
makers. In the next chapter, we turn our attention to the relation between the degree
of risk aversion and the value of information and show that even in a restricted class
of information bundles the direction of relation changes under different circumstances.
III.3. Value of Information and the Level of Initial Wealth
Another determinant of the value of information is the level of initial wealth. The
decision maker’s attitude towards the lottery depends on the level of wealth. The risk
attitude is a function of wealth as long as the utility function of the decision maker
does not exhibit constant degree of risk aversion. Even though the decision maker is
risk averse, for high levels of wealth, he may exhibit a behavior similar to a risk neutral
decision maker. In this short section, we show that a monotonic relation between the
level of initial wealth and the value of information exists for information bundles Fi.
Proposition 6 Let u(x) be a concave utility function. Then if (EU−u0) ·pii < 0, EUi
is non-increasing in the level of initial wealth, W .
Proof: First consider pii > 0. By Proposition 2, EUi = (u(W+pii)−u(W ))·pi. Then,
dEUi/dW = (u′(W + pii) − u′(W )) · pi, and the result holds as u′(W + pii) ≤ u′(W ).
The opposite case, pii < 0, follows in a similar manner. ¤
One final observation is that the value of information about an outcome is non-
increasing with the level initial wealth, W , for utility functions with a constant co-
efficient of absolute risk aversion. We know from La Valle [17] that, such a utility
function can be represented as u(x) = −exp(−ax) where a is the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. We state this result in the proposition below.
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Proposition 7 Let u(x) be a concave utility function with a constant coefficient of
absolute risk aversion. Then EUi is non-increasing in the level of initial wealth, W .
Proof: When (EU − u0) · pii < 0, the result follows from Proposition 6, so we treat
the opposite case here. From Proposition 2, EUi =max{0, |(ui − u0)| · pi− |EU− u0|}.
Then,
|(ui − u0)| · pi− |EU− u0| = pi · |exp(−a ·W )− exp(−a · (W + pii))| − |
∑
k pk·
(exp(−a ·W )− exp(−a · (W + pik))| (3.6)
Since d(|(ui − u0)| · pi)/dW ≤ 0 (see proof of Proposition 6), we will finish the proof if
we show that the derivative of the second piece in 3.6 is non-negative. When EU ≥ u0,
d(|EU − u0|)/dW = a · exp(−a ·W )(
∑
k pk · exp(−a · pik)− 1). Since the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion is constant, (
∑
k pk · exp(−a · pik)− 1) > 0 and this leads to the
desired conclusion. The case of EU < u0, follows similarly. ¤
III.4. Numerical Results
The value of information about a particular outcome depends on the utility func-
tion, the level of outcome, the probability of the outcome and the expected payoff
from the lottery. In this section, we analyze numerically the behavior of the value of
information with respect to these determinants. We will differentiate between a risk
neutral and risk averse decision maker and observe how the risk taking behavior of the
decision maker impacts the value of information.
III.4.1. Risk Neutral Decision Maker
First, we consider a risk neutral decision maker with u(x) = x. In the risk neutral
case, if the lottery is attractive when there is no information, then information about


































Fig. 1. Value of Information as the Number of Outcomes Increases.
If such an outcome is realized, the decision maker’s action does not change. Similarly,
if the outcome is not realized, the decision to play or not is unchanged, since the
conditional expected payoff from the lottery is still positive. Given that such a outcome
does not occur, the player still expects to earn a positive payoff. However, if an
outcome with a low value has a higher likelihood relative to rest of the states, then the
corresponding information may be valuable. The decision maker could be willing to
play the lottery in no information case just because of the likelihood that this particular
outcome will occur. In such a case, learning that particular outcome does not occur
may induce the decision maker to skip the lottery instead.
In order to illustrate the effect of change in likelihood on the value of information,































Fig. 2. Value of Information as Expected Payoff from the Lottery Increases when the
Original Decision is to Play the Lottery.
equally likely. Under this setting, the number of possible outcomes have an effect
on the value of information as the likelihoods of outcomes are influenced. The value
of information about a single outcome does not depend on what the other outcomes
are as long as the expected payoff remains the same. As the number of outcomes
increases, the likelihood of each outcome decreases, and value of information about an
outcome decreases. The impact of information on the original decision diminishes as
the likelihood of this particular outcome approaches zero. Figure 1 illustrates this.
Figure 2 shows the behavior in different lotteries having different expected payoffs.
All the expected payoffs from different lotteries were taken as positive. The value of






























Fig. 3. Value of Information as Expected Payoff from the Lottery Increases when the
Original Decision is to Skip the Lottery.
do not reveal any valuable information, however some valuable information might be
revealed when they don’t occur. As the expected payoff of the original lottery increases,
they have less impact on the sign of the conditional expected payoff given they don’t
occur. Therefore, the value of information decreases linearly. Similar behavior is not
observed for the negative outcomes. The expected payoff earned from the lottery has no
impact on the value of information. When the decision maker learns that a negative
outcome is not realized, there is no reason to change the original decision. On the
contrary, when such an outcome is realized, we know that the decision maker will
make use of this piece of information to modify the decision. Thus, the expected value
of the lottery has no impact on the value of information regarding negative outcomes.
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Table 1. Value of Information on Different Outcomes as a Function of “n”.
Payoff VOI for n=2 VOI for n=4 VOI for n=8 VOI for n=16
-15 1620009.186 802755.0931 394128.0466 189814.5233
-13 206707.196 96104.098 40802.549 13151.7745
-11 15437.57086 469.2854288 0 0
-10...0 0 0 0 0
1 0.316060279 0.15803014 0.07901507 0.039507535
2 0.432332358 0.216166179 0.10808309 0.054041545
3 0.475106466 0.237553233 0.118776616 0.059388308
4 0.490842181 0.24542109 0.122710545 0.061355273
10 0.4999773 0.24998865 0.124994325 0.062497163
15 0.499999847 0.249999924 0.124999962 0.062499981
However, the opposite conclusion prevails when the numerical results are determined
assuming negative expected payoff from the original lottery. Figure 3 illustrates this
second case.
III.4.2. Risk Averse Decision Maker
The more interesting case is a risk averse decision maker. We will consider a
utility function with constant coeffient of absolute risk aversion, u(x) = −exp(−ax).
The decision maker becomes more risk averse as a increases. As the decision maker
becomes more risk averse, the certainty equivalent of the lottery increases. We will
determine the value of information regarding a particular outcome by considering an
imaginary lottery in which outcomes are equally likely. The decision maker has an
initial level of wealth W . Table 1 illustrates the value of information for different
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outcomes in a lottery which yields the decision maker an expected utility of −14500.
The coefficient of risk aversion is taken as 1. This choice of expected utility quantity
might seem unusual at first, however, the particular utility function is an exponential
function. As opposed to the risk neutral case, the initial decision is to skip the lottery.
Hence, any positive outcome conveys valuable information. However, the value of
information regarding a positive outcome is quite insignificant. This is mainly due to
the particular form of the exponential utility function. Marginal utility earned from
increasing the outcome diminishes rapidly. As n increases, the value of information
decreases for each outcome. The positive outcomes convey valuable information when
they occur, so the decrease in their likelihood decreases the possibility of obtaining
valuable information. Conversely, the negative outcomes can only make an impact
when they do not occur. However, as a negative outcome becomes less likely, the
decision maker may not be better off learning this particular outcome is not realized
because he may still expect to do worse.
As in the risk neutral case, the value of information about an outcome depends
on the rest of the outcomes only through the expected utility earned by playing the
lottery. As long as the expected utility remains below the utility earned by skipping
the lottery, the value of information regarding positive outcomes remains the same.
The same behavior is observed for negative outcomes as long as the expected utility is
higher than the utility earned from skipping the lottery. In those case, the value of in-
formation depends only on the likelihood of the particular outcome. Table 2 illustrates
the value of information about several outcomes in different imaginary lotteries as the
expected utility earned from the lottery changes. We fixed n = 8 and a = 1. It is not
surprising to observe that the value of information regarding positive outcomes remains
the same. The reason behind this is exactly the same as in risk neutral case: the value
of information regarding a positive outcome comes from modifying the decision when
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Table 2. Value of Information for Different Outcomes as a Function of Expected Utility
Earned without Information.
VOI VOI VOI VOI VOI
Payoff EU=-100000 EU=-10000 EU=-1000 EU=-100 EU=-1
-15 308628.0466 398628.0466 407628.0466 408528.0466 408627.046559
-13 0 45302.549 54302.549 55202.549 55301.549001
-11 0 0 6485.142714 7385.142714 7484.142714
-10 0 0 1754.183224 2654.183224 2753.183224
-7 0 0 0 37.9541448 136.954145
-3 0 0 0 0 2.385692
-1 0 0 0 0 0.214785
1 0.07901507 0.07901507 0.07901507 0.07901507 0.07901507
2 0.10808309 0.10808309 0.10808309 0.10808309 0.10808309
5 0.124157757 0.124157757 0.124157757 0.124157757 0.124157757
10 0.124994325 0.124994325 0.124994325 0.124994325 0.124994325
15 0.124999962 0.124999962 0.124999962 0.124999962 0.124999962
that outcome is realized, so the expected utility earned from playing the lottery has
no impact on this. On the other hand, the value of information regarding negative
outcomes increases as the expected utility earned from the lottery gets closer to the
utility earned from skipping the lottery. The player considers a change in action when
such an outcome is not realized as the initial decision becomes less clear cut.
The level of risk aversion also has an impact on the value of information, although
there is no monotonic relation between two. Suppose (EU−u0)·pii < 0 holds. Then from
Proposition 2, EUi = |(ui−u0) · pi|. When pii > 0, EUi = −pi.exp(−aW )(exp(−apii)−
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Table 3. Value of Information for Different Outcomes as a Changes When W = 0.
VOI VOI VOI VOI VOI
Payoff for a=0.1 for a=0.5 for a=0.8 for a=1 for a=2
-15 0 0 5845.223927 394128.0466 1.3358 1012
-13 0 0 0 40802.549 2.4466 1010
-11 0 0 0 0 4.481 108
-7 0 0 0 0 1.3583 105
-3 0 0 0 0 0
-1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.011895 0.049184 0.068834 0.079015 0.108083
2 0.022659 0.079015 0.099763 0.108083 0.122711
5 0.049184 0.114739 0.122711 0.124158 0.124994
10 0.079015 0.124158 0.124958 0.124994 0.125000
15 0.097109 0.124931 0.124999 0.125000 0.125000
1), and dEUi
da
= pi · exp(−aW ) · (exp(−apii)(W + pii) −W ). Clearly, it is not possible
to sign this expression. Similar observation can be made for the other cases, so it is
not possible to find a monotonic relationship between the value of information and the
degree of absolute risk aversion. In numerical examples, the expected utility from the
original lottery is taken as −14500 and the number of possible outcomes are fixed at
n = 8. First, the level of initial wealth, W , is fixed at 0. As observed in Table 3, the
value of information increases with coefficient of absolute risk aversion. In this table,
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion does not have an impact on the maximum value
of information regarding a positive outcome, which is 0.12500. However, as a increases,
the convergence is much faster. Note that when n = 8, the value of information cannot
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Table 4. Value of Information for Different Outcomes as a Changes When W = 10.
VOI VOI VOI VOI VOI
Payoff for a=0.1 for a=0.5 for a=0.8 for a=1 for a=2
-15 0 0 0 0 0
-13 0 0 0 0 0
-11 0 0 0 0 0
-7 0 0 0 0 0
-3 0 0 0 0 0
-1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.004376 0.000331 2.3091 10−5 3.5873 10−6 2.2278 10−10
2 0.008336 0.000532 3.3467 10−5 4.907 10−6 2.5293 10−10
5 0.018094 0.000773 4.1165 10−5 5.6367 10−6 2.5763 10−10
10 0.029068 0.000837 4.1919 10−5 5.6747 10−6 2.5764 10−10
15 0.035724 0.000842 4.1933 10−5 5.675 10−6 2.5764 10−10
exceed 1
8
(−exp(−apii)+ 1) and the higher the value of a, the faster the utility function
converges to zero. For the negative outcome, as the decision maker gets more risk
averse, the impact of learning that such an outcome is not realized is less on the initial
decision. The player is less willing to reconsider the initial decision; he has to make
sure that a negative outcome is not realized to change his mind. Second, the level of
initial wealth is fixed at 10, and one can observe that the value of information decreases
with the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. This is illustrated in Table 4.
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CHAPTER IV
BUYING PRICE OF INFORMATION IN LOTTERIES
Buying price, bF ,u, of information bundle F provide a nice way to compare value
of information among different individuals as it is expressed in monetary terms. As in
Chapter III, the decision maker faces the same decision of either playing or skipping
a lottery with a finite number possible outcomes. Hence, the definition of the buying
price slightly different than in Definition 7, where the decision maker is assumed to
keep his initial wealth without playing a lottery in case no information is acquired. In
the general case, the decision maker may choose an action from the set A even when
he does not purchase information. Thus, bF ,u is defined as follows.
Definition 9 The buying price of information bundle F for a decision maker with a
utility function u(p(pi, a)) is:
E[maxa∈AFE[u(p(pi, a)− bF ,u)|F ]] = maxa∈AE[u(p(pi, a))] (4.1)
where p(pi, a) is the payoff when the outcome of the lottery is pi and the decision maker
takes action a, A is the set of available actions when no information is obtained and
AF is the set of available actions when information bundle F is purchased.
The buying price of the information bundle is the maximum price the decision
maker would be willing to pay to purchase the information. In this chapter, we continue
our discussion to compare the value of information bundles Fi. Let bi,u denote the
buying price of Fi for a decision maker with a utility function u. We will determine
the cases where it is possible to draw certain conclusions about the relation between
risk aversion and the value of information.
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IV.1. Buying Price vs Expected Utility Approach
As Hazen and Sounderpian [13] shows, the preference ranking of information is
not the same under both approaches. In this section, we address the relation between
two approaches, and show when the preference reversals occur. In this discussion, we
restrict ourselves to the information bundles Fi.
Proposition 8 Let u(x) be a strictly increasing utility function and let pii be an out-
come of the lottery. EUi > 0⇔ bi,u > 0.
Proof: We start with the case (EU − u0) · pii ≤ 0. First assume that pii > 0 and
u(W ) ≥ EU. Then bi,u satisfies




1− pi ·u(W+pik−bi,u)} (4.2)
Assume that bi,u = 0. Then the right hand side of the equation 4.2 reduces to max{pi ·
u(W +pii)+(1−pi) ·u(W ),
∑n
k=1 pk ·u(W +pik)}. Since pii > 0, the certainty equivalent
of the lottery {pik, pk/(1−pi)} is less thanW because the utility function u(x) is strictly
increasing. Hence pi · u(W + pii) + (1 − pi) · u(W ) >
∑n
k=1 pk · u(W + pik). However,
pi ·u(W +pii)+ (1− pi) ·u(W ) > u(W ), which contradicts 4.2 when bi,u = 0. Since the
right hand side of 4.2 is continuous and decreasing in bi,u, ∃ bi,u > 0 that satisfies the
equation. The converse implication follows from Proposition 2.
When pii < 0 and u(W ) ≤ EU, bi,u satisfies




1− pi · u(W + pik − bi,u)} (4.3)
Assume again that bi,u = 0. Then the right hand side in 4.3 becomes max{u(W ), pi ·
u(W ) +
∑
k 6=i pk · u(W + pik)}. Since pii < 0 and u(x) is strictly increasing, u(W ) <
pi · u(W ) +
∑
k 6=i pk · u(W + pik). However, EU < pi · u(W ) +
∑
k 6=i pk · u(W + pik),
which is a contradiction. As in the first case, ∃ bi,u > 0 that satisfies the equation. The
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converse implication follows from Proposition 2
Next, consider the case (EU − u0) · pii > 0. When pii > 0, u(W ) ≤ EU. Then
EUi ≥ 0 implies that (u(W + pii)− u(W )) · pi > EU− u(W ). After a little algebra, we
obtain u(W ) >
∑
k 6=i (pk/(1− pi)) · u(W + pik). The equation for bi,u is
EU = max{pi ·u(W +pii− bi,u)+ (1− pi) ·u(W − bi,u),
∑
k
pk ·u(W +pik− bi,u)} (4.4)
If bi,u = 0 is the solution for 4.4, the equation becomes
∑
k
pk · u(W + pik) = max{pi · u(W + pii) + (1− pi) · u(W ),
∑
k
pk · u(W + pik)}
which implies u(W ) ≤∑k 6=i (pk/(1− pi)) · u(W + pik) after a little algebra. This is a
contradiction. Hence, bi,u > 0. Conversely, assume that bi,u > 0. Then,
∑
k pk · u(W +
pik) = pi · u(W + pii − bi,u) + (1 − pi) · u(W − bi,u). Since the right hand side of this
inequality is strictly decreasing in bi,u,
∑
k pk ·u(W+pik) < pi ·u(W+pii)+(1−pi)·u(W ),
or after a little arrangement we obtain (u(W + pii)− u(W )) · pi > EU− u(W ), which
is the condition for EUi > 0.
The last case we consider is pii < 0 and EU ≤ u(W ). Assume first that EUi > 0.
This implies
∑
k 6=i pk ·u(W +pik) > u(W ) · (1−pi). If bi,u = 0, then u(W ) ≥ pi ·u(W )+∑
k 6=i pk · u(W + pik), which is a contradiction. Conversely, assume that bi,u > 0, then
u(W ) = pi · u(W − bi,u) +
∑
k 6=i pk · u(W + pik − bi,u). Since u is strictly decreasing in
bi,u, this equality implies (1 − pi) · u(W ) <
∑
k 6=i pk · u(W + pik − bi,u), so EUi > 0.
Hence, under all possible cases EUi > 0⇔ bi,u > 0. ¤
Corollary 5 Let u(x) be a strictly increasing utility function and let pii be an outcome
of the lottery. Then (EU− u0) · pii ≤ 0 implies that bi,u > 0.
Proof: By Proposition 2 (EU − u0) · pii ≤ 0 ⇒ EUi > 0 and the result follows from
Proposition 8. ¤
Proposition 8 and Corollary 5 state a result that is analogous to Proposition 2. The
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information always has positive value when there is a possibility of changing the initial
decision. Proposition 8 and Corollary 5 say that decision maker pays a strictly positive
amount for such information. It does not make any sense to pay for information
otherwise because no decision maker has the motivation to pay for an information
bundle that does not change the initial decision.
Corollary 6 Let u(x) be a strictly increasing utility function and let pii be an outcome
of the lottery. Then EUi = 0 if and only if bi,u = 0.
Proof: Follows directly from Proposition 8. ¤
The following result clarifies when the preference rankings are preserved and when
the reversals occur for information bundles Fi:
Proposition 9 Let u(x) be a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function
exhibiting non-increasing degree of risk aversion, and let pii > pij, pii, pij 6= 0 be two
outcomes of the lottery. Then,
(a) If pii · pij > 0, then EUj ≥ EUi implies bj,u ≥ bi,u.
(b) If pii · pij < 0, then EUi ≥ EUj implies bi,u ≥ bj,u.
Proof: To prove (a), we consider two cases,
Case 1 (0 > pii > pij): Assume EUj ≥ EUi. The desired conclusion holds whenever
EUj = 0 or EUi = 0 by Corollary 6. Hence, we will only analyze the cases EUj,EUi > 0.
Then EUj ≥ EUi implies (u(W ) − u(W + pii)) · pi ≤ (u(W ) − u(W + pij)) · pj. Since
bi,u, bj,u > 0, the equations for the buying prices are
max {EU, u(W )} = pi · u(W − bi,u) +
∑
k 6=i
pk · u(W + pik − bi,u) (4.5)
max {EU, u(W )} = pj · u(W − bj,u) +
∑
k 6=j
pk · u(W + pik − bj,u) (4.6)
48
Combining 4.5 and 4.6, we obtain
pi · u(W − bi,u) + pj · u(W + pij − bi,u) +
∑
k 6=i,j pk · u(W + pik − bi,u) =
pj · u(W − bj,u) + pi · u(W + pii − bj,u) +
∑
k 6=i,j pk · u(W + pik − bj,u) (4.7)
Assume that bi,u > bj,u, then clearly
∑
k 6=i,j pk · u(W + pik − bi,u) <
∑
k 6=i,j pk · u(W +
pik − bj,u). Then, if the equality holds, pi · u(W − bi,u) + pj · u(W + pij − bi,u) >
pj · u(W − bj,u) + pi · u(W + pii − bj,u). Since bi,u > bj,u, the final inequality implies
pi · u(W − bj,u) + pj · u(W + pij − bj,u) > pj · u(W − bj,u) + pi · u(W + pii− bj,u). After a
little algebra
u(W − bj,u)− u(W + pij − bj,u)




Since u(x) exhibits non-increasing degree of risk aversion and it is strictly concave
u(W − bj,u)− u(W + pij − bj,u)
u(W − bj,u)− u(W + pii − bj,u) >
u(W )− u(W + pij)




Note that 4.9 follows from EUj ≥ EUi. Clearly, 4.9 contradicts 4.8, so bj,u ≥ bi,u.
Case 2 (pii > pij > 0): In this case, EUj ≥ EUi implies (u(W + pij)− u(W )) · pj ≥
(u(W + pii)− u(W )) · pi. The buying prices, bi,u, bj,u > 0, satisfy
pi·u(W+pii−bi,u)+(1−pi)·u(W−bi,u) = pj ·u(W+pij−bj,u)+(1−pj)·u(W−bj,u) (4.10)
Assume bi,u > bj,u. Then, since u(x) is strictly increasing, 4.10 implies
pi·u(W+pii−bi,u)+(1−pi)·u(W−bi,u) > pj ·u(W+pij−bi,u)+(1−pj)·u(W−bi,u) (4.11)
and after rearranging 4.11, we obtain
u(W + pij − bi,u)− u(W − bi,u)




Inequality 4.12 implies a contradiction as in case 1, so EUj ≥ EUi implies bj,u ≥ bi,u.
Therefore, (a) holds.
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Now, we prove (b). In this case, pii > 0 > pij. EUi ≥ EUj implies ((u(W + pii) −
u(W )) ·pi−(EU−u(W )) ≥ (u(W )−u(W +pij)) ·pj. After a little algebra, this becomes
u(W ) ≥∑k 6=i,j (pk/(1− pi − pj)) · u(W + pik). Then bj,u, bi,u > 0 satisfy the following
equation
pi · u(W + pii − bi,u) + pj · u(W − bi,u) + (1− pi − pj) · u(W − bi,u) =
pi · u(W + pii − bj,u) + pj · u(W − bj,u) + (1− pi − pj) ·
∑
k 6=i,j (pk/(1− pi − pj)) ·
u(W + pik − bj,u)
If bj,u > bi,u, then u(W − bi,u) <
∑
k 6=i,j (pk/(1 − pi − pj)) · u(W + pik − bj,u) should
hold, which is a contradiction as u(x) exhibits non-increasing degree of risk aversion.
Hence, EUi ≥ EUj implies bi,u ≥ bj,u. ¤
Let S be the space of utility functions and the finite outcome lotteries including
pairs (u, L) such that u is strictly concave and increasing, and L is simple. Both ap-
proaches of quantifying information partitions this space into two subsets in comparing
the value of Fi and Fj at a given wealthW . Then Proposition 9 states that the relation
between these two partitions can pictured as in Figure 4 when pii · pij > 0. Note that,
the partition is different when pii · pij < 0. When the decision maker is asked to pay for
acquisition of an information bundle, the nature of the lottery decision changes. If he
actually agrees to pay, then the lottery decision is taken after the payment is made, i.e.
at a lower level of wealth. This may result in a preference reversal on the information
bundles. In the next example, we will illustrate cases where the preference reversals
occur.
IV.1.1. An Illustration of Preference Reversals
We illustrate three cases where preference reversals occur. Consider a decision
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Fig. 4. Partition of S by Two Different Approaches of Quantifying Information when
pii · pij > 0.
Table 5. First Lottery in the Example.
Probability 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.175 0.075 0.125 0.125









)2 : x < 0
This utility function is continuously differentiable and strictly concave. First, consider
the lottery described in Table 5. If we compute the the value of information on outcomes
−4 and −5, we obtain EU−4 = 0.216312 and EU−5 = 0.205205. However, b−4,u =
0.537605754 and b−5,u = 0.596452717. This illustrates a preference reversal when
pii < 0, pij < 0 and pii > pij in that EUi > EUj does not necessarily imply that
bi,u > bj,u. The next example lottery is illustrated in Table 6. The only difference in
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Table 6. Second Lottery in the Example.
Probability 0.076 0.174 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
Outcome, $ 10 3 -3 12 -4 -5 20 5
Table 7. Third Lottery in the Example.
Probability 0.125 0.05 0.05 0.125 0.039 0.361 0.125 0.125
Outcome, $ 10 3 -3 12 -4 -5 20 5
these examples is the probability of outcomes. In this example, EU10 = 0.176063 and
EU3 = 0.174, however b10,u = 0.249927999 and b3,u = 0.259190804. Hence, expected
utility approach favors information on outcome 10 whereas the ranking changes in
buying price approach. This is another example why (a) of Proposition 9 does not
hold in the opposite case. The final example that we analyze is illustrated in Table 7,
which illustrates why (b) of Proposition 9 does not hold in the opposite case. When
we rank information on outcomes 3 and −5, we observe that preference reversal occurs
using difference in expected utility approach and buying price approach: EU3 = 0.05
and EU−5 = 0.06728 whereas b3,u = 0.087598046 and b−5,u = 0.070327026. Information
about a negative outcome is preferred in expected utility approach, however the decision
maker pays more to obtain information on a positive outcome.
IV.2. Risk Aversion and the Value of Information
In this section, we establish how the decision maker’s buying price for information
about an outcome changes as he becomes more risk averse. We state the main result
of this chapter below.
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Proposition 10 Let u(x) and v(x) be strictly concave and increasing utility functions
such that (a) ru(x) ≥ rv(x) (b) Both u(x) and v(x) exhibit non-increasing absolute risk
aversion. Then,
(i) If u0 ≥ EU and v0 ≥ EV, then bi,v ≥ bi,u.
(ii) If pii > 0, u0 ≤ EU and v0 ≤ EV, then bi,v ≤ bi,u.
Proof: Under (i), we consider two cases. First assume pii > 0. The equations are
u(W ) = max(pi ·u(W +pii−bi,u)+(1−pi) ·u(W −bi,u),
n∑
k=1
pk ·u(W +pik−bi,u)) (4.13)
v(W ) = max(pi ·v(W +pii−bi,v)+(1−pi) ·v(W −bi,v),
n∑
k=1
pk ·v(W +pik−bi,v)) (4.14)
Since both utility functions exhibit non-increasing absolute risk aversion, pi · u(W +
pii− bi,u)+ (1− pi) · u(W − bi,u) >
∑n
k=1 pk · u(W + pik− bi,u) and pi · v(W + pii− bi,v)+
(1− pi) · v(W − bi,v) >
∑n
k=1 pk · v(W + pik − bi,v). Hence, 4.13 and 4.14 reduce to
u(W ) = pi · u(W + pii − bi,u) + (1− pi) · u(W − bi,u) (4.15)
v(W ) = pi · v(W + pii − bi,v) + (1− pi) · v(W − bi,v) (4.16)
Let
F =
 W + pii − bi,u : w.p. piW − bi,u : w.p. 1− pi
As the Equation 4.15 suggests c(F, u) = W and since ru ≥ rv, 4.16 implies c(F, v) ≥ W ,
or in other words
pi ·v(W+pii−bi,u)+(1−pi)·v(W−bi,u) ≥ pi ·v(W+pii−bi,v)+(1−pi)·v(W−bi,v) (4.17)
Inequality 4.17 holds if and only if bi,v ≥ bi,u.
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Next, consider the case pii < 0. The equations are




1− pi ·u(W +pik−bi,u)) (4.18)




1− pi ·v(W +pik−bi,v)) (4.19)
We cannot discern which term in the max operator should be dominating in 4.18 and
4.19, so we consider four subcases.
Subcase 1: u(W ) = u(W − bi,u) and v(W ) = v(W − bi,v). Clearly, this holds if and
only if bi,u = bi,v = 0.
Subcase 2: u(W ) = u(W−bi,u) and v(W ) = pi·v(W−bi,v)+
∑
k 6=i pk·v(W+pik−bi,v).
It is also clear that bi,v ≥ bi,u = 0.
Subcase 3: v(W ) = v(W−bi,v) and u(W ) = pi·u(W−bi,u)+
∑
k 6=i pk·u(W+pik−bi,u).
This case is the opposite of subcase 2, and we will show that this subcase leads to a
contradiction. Note first bi,v = 0. Hence, v(W ) ≥
∑
k 6=i (pk/(1−pi)) ·v(W +pik). This
implies u(W − bi,u) ≥
∑
k 6=i (pk/(1− pi)) ·u(W +pik− bi,u) for bi,u ≥ 0 as u(x) exhibits
non-increasing absolute risk aversion. This is a contradiction. Hence, this subcase is
not possible.
Subcase 4: u(W ) = pi · u(W − bi,u) +
∑
k 6=i pk · u(W + pik − bi,u) and v(W ) =
pi · v(W − bi,v) +
∑
k 6=i pk · v(W + pik − bi,v). Consider G = {W + pik − bi,u, pk}nk=1 with
pii = 0. Clearly, c(G, u) = W and c(G, v) ≥ W . This implies
pi · v(W − bi,u) +
∑
k 6=i pk · v(W + pik − bi,u) >
pi · v(W − bi,v) +
∑
k 6=i pk · v(W + pik − bi,v)
which holds iff bi,v ≥ bi,u. This finishes the proof of (i).
Under (ii), the equations are the following
EU = max(pi ·u(W +pii− bi,u)+ (1− pi) ·u(W − bi,u),
n∑
k=1
pk ·u(W +pik− bi,u)) (4.20)
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EV = max(pi · v(W +pii− bi,v)+ (1− pi) · v(W − bi,v),
n∑
k=1
pk · v(W + pik− bi,v)) (4.21)
We cannot reduce the Equations 4.20 and 4.21 further, so we need to consider four
subcases
Subcase 1: EU = pi · u(W + pii − bi,u) + (1− pi) · u(W − bi,u) and EV =
∑n
k=1 pk ·
v(W + pik − bi,v)). Clearly, bi,u ≥ bi,u = 0.
Subcase 2: EU =
∑n
k=1 pk ·u(W +pik− bi,u)) and EV =
∑n
k=1 pk ·v(W +pik− bi,v)).
Equalities hold if and only if bi,u = bi,v = 0.
Subcase 3: EU = pi ·u(W+pii−bi,u)+(1−pi) ·u(W−bi,u) and EV = pi ·v(W+pii−
bi,v)+ (1− pi) · v(W − bi,v). Let L′ = {pik, pk/(1− pi)}nk=1,k 6=i. Then the original lottery
can be equivalently represented for the decision maker with utility function u(x) as
follows.
L =
 W + pii : w.p. pic(L′, u) : w.p. 1− pi
Accordingly, the equation for u(x) can be written as follows,
pi · u(W + pii) + (1− pi) · u(c(L′, u)) = pi · u(W + pii − bi,u) + (1− pi) · u(W − bi,u)
u(W + pii)− u(W + pii − bi,u)




whereW+pii ≥ W+pii−bi,u ≥ W−bi,u ≥ c(L′, u). Since rv(x) ≤ ru(x), ∃ an increasing
concave function ψ such that u(x) = ψ(v(x)) (see [24]). Then, by concavity and 4.22
v(W + pii)− v(W + pii − bi,u)





(1− pi) · v(W − bi,u) + pi · v(W + pii − bi,u) ≤ pi · v(W + pii) + (1− pi) · v(c(L′, u))
≤ pi · v(W + pii) + (1− pi) · v(c(L′, v))
≤ EV
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≤ (1− pi) · v(W − bi,v) + pi · v(W + pii − bi,v)
This holds if and only if bi,u ≥ bi,v.
Subcase 4: EU =
∑n
k=1 pk ·u(W+pik−bi,u)) and EV = pi ·v(W+pii−bi,v)+(1−pi)·
v(W−bi,v). We will show this case is not possible. Suppose that pi·v(W+pii−bi,v)+(1−
pi) · v(W − bi,v) >
∑n
k=1 pk · v(W +pik− bi,v). This condition differentiates this subcase
from subcase 2. Then, v(W−bi,v) >
∑
k 6=i (pk/(1−pi))·v(W+pik−bi,v). Since bi,u = 0,∑
k 6=i (pk/(1−pi)) ·u(W +pik) ≥ u(W ) which leads to
∑
k 6=i (pk/(1−pi)) ·v(W +pik) ≥
v(W ). Since v(x) exhibits non-increasing absolute risk aversion, this is a contradiction.
Hence, under (ii), bi,u ≥ bi,v. This completes the proof. ¤
If pii < 0, u0 ≤ EU and v0 ≤ EV, then it is not possible to come up with certain
conclusions. Note that, by Proposition 9, the original equations reduce to
EU = pi · u(W − bi,u) +
∑
k 6=i
pk · u(W + pik − bi,u)
EV = pi · v(W − bi,v) +
∑
k 6=i
pk · v(W + pik − bi,v) (4.23)
Both sides of the equations evaluate a lottery. The right hand side of the equations
in 4.23 evaluates the original lottery L and the right hand side of the first equation
evaluates the lottery
H =
 W − bi,u : w.p. piH ′ : w.p. 1− pi
where H ′ = {W + pik − bi,u, pk/(1 − pi)}nk=1,k 6=i. The equation for the decision maker
with utility function u(x) can be rewritten as
pi · u(W + pii) + (1− pi) · u(c(L′, u)) = pi · u(W − bi,u) + (1− pi) · u(c(H ′, u))
pi
1− pi =
u(c(L′, u))− u(c(H ′, u))
u(W − bi,u)− u(W + pii) (4.24)
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where W + pii ≤ W − bi,u ≤ c(H ′, u) ≤ c(L′, u). From here 4.24, we obtain
pi
1− pi ≤
v(c(L′, u))− v(c(H ′, u))
v(W − bi,u)− v(W + pii) (4.25)
If v(c(L′, v))− v(c(H ′, v)) ≥ v(c(L′, u))− v(c(H ′, u)), then 4.25 implies
pi · v(W + pii) + (1− pi) · v(c(L′, v)) ≥ pi · v(W − bi,u) + (1− pi) · v(c(H ′, v))
pi · v(W − bi,v) +
∑






which holds if and only if bi,u ≥ bi,v. We have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Let u(x) and v(x) be strictly concave and increasing utility functions
such that ru(x) ≥ rv(x). Consider the case with pii < 0, u0 ≤ EU and v0 ≤ EV.
Then bi,u ≥ bi,v if v(c(L′, v)) − v(c(H ′, v)) ≥ v(c(L′, u)) − v(c(H ′, u)), where L′ =
{pik, pk/(1− pi)}nk=1,k 6=i and H ′ = {W + pik − bi,u, pk/(1− pi)}nk=1,k 6=i.
Following Propositions 10 and 11, we arrive at interesting conclusions. The less
risk averse decision maker values information more when his original decision is to
skip the lottery. In this case, the less risk averse decision maker seems to value an
opportunity to change the decision more than the more risk averse decision maker.
This makes sense as the certainty equivalent of the lottery is greater for the less risk
averse decision maker, so despite the initial decision to skip the lottery, he is more
willing to give a second chance to evaluate the lottery. The more risk averse decision
maker does not value the lottery as much, and gives less value for a chance to reconsider
the lottery. In opposite case, when the outcome in question is positive, it seems that
the more risk averse decision maker is more nervous that the lottery could bring about
unfavorable outcomes despite the initial favorable decision. Therefore, he values more
to pursue further information to see if it is really necessary to play the lottery. The
less risk averse decision maker seems to care less about such an information gathering
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activity.
IV.2.1. An Example on the Risk Aversion and the Value of Information
In this example, we compute the the buying price using the utility function u(x) =
−exp(−ax), where a is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. First, we consider a
lottery in which u(W ) ≥ EU and an outcome pii > 0. In this case, the equation for bi,u
is
U(W ) = pi · u(W + pii − bi,u) + (1− pi) · u(W − bi,u)).
Substituting the specific utility function and making necessary cancellations
1 = pi · exp(−a · pii) · exp(a · bi,u) + (1− pi) · exp(a · bi,u) (4.26)
Solving 4.26, we obtain
bi,u = −1
a
· ln(1 + pi · (exp(−a · pii)− 1)) (4.27)
Note that, bi,u > 0 as pii > 0, and the expression in 4.27 is independent of W as the
decision maker’s risk attitude is independent of W . In order to see the behavior of







· [ pi · pi · exp(−a · pii) · a
1− pi + pi · exp(−a · pii) + ln(1 + pi · (exp(−a · pii)− 1))] (4.28)
The first term in the brackets in Equation 4.28 is positive whereas the second term is
negative. Proposition 10 states that 4.28 has to be negative, and we will verify this
conclusion. After a little algebra, expression is negative if and only if
pii · pi · a
exp(a · pii) · (1− pi) + pi ≤ a · pii + ln(
1
exp(a · pii) · (1− pi) + pi ) (4.29)
Two expressions in 4.29 are equal when pi = 0 and pi = 1. It is not possible to verify
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this inequality right away, so we check the derivatives with respect to pi. Define
∂LHS = d(
pii · pi · a
exp(a · pii) · (1− pi) + pi )/dpi
∂RHS = d(a · pii + ln( 1
exp(a · pii) · (1− pi) + pi ))/dpi.
Then
∂LHS =
pii · a · exp(−a · pii)
[exp(a · pii) · (1− pi)]2
∂RHS =
exp(a · pii)− 1
exp(a · pii) · (1− pi) + pi .




This inequality changes direction for pi ∈ [p¯i, 1]. This and the equality of expressions
in 4.29 implies that dbi,u/da < 0, which verifies the case (a) of Proposition 10 for
u(x) = −exp(−ax). Next, we illustrate that case (b) of Proposition 10 cannot be
stated for pi < 0 without the additional condition in Proposition 11. The equation for
the buying price is
EU = pi · u(W − bi,u) +
∑
k 6=i pk · u(W + pik − bi,u)
Then, we substitute the utility function and simplify the expression
∑
k
pk · exp(−a · pik) = exp(a · bi,u) · (pi +
∑
k 6=i
pk · exp(−a · pik)) (4.30)






k pk · exp(−a · pik)
pi +
∑
k 6=i pk · exp(−a · pik)
) (4.31)
Consider the lottery in table 8. When we set a = 1, EU > u0. If we compute the
derivative of 4.31 with respect to a, d(b−1,u)/da|a=1 < 0 and d(b−1.8,u)/da|a=1 > 0. In
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Table 8. Lottery for Illustration of Proposition 11.
Probability 0.125 0.125 0.05 0.2 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
Outcome, $ 10 3 -1 12 -1.8 15 20 5
particular, b−1,u|a=1 = 0.10042363 and b−1,u|a=1.01 = 0.099363105 whereas b−1.8,u|a=1 =
1.210560037 and b−1.8,u|a=1.01 = 0.210615481. This shows that we need an additional
condition to ensure that case (b) of Proposition 10 holds for pii < 0, too.
60
CHAPTER V
VALUE OF INFORMATION IN INSURANCE RISK PROBLEMS
Consider a decision maker or enterprise (“the firm”) at risk of losing an amount
of capital (money) due to the occurence of unexpected events. Insurance coverage is
available, at a premium, to partially compensate the firm should such a monetary loss
occur. The firm must decide how much insurance to purchase. Clearly, a number of
factors will influence the firm’s decision, including the premium charged, the level of
coverage available, the firm’s utility function, and the risk of loss (e.g., probability dis-
tribution of loss). Before the insurance decision is made, the firm may, at a cost, gather
data and facts that may help it refine its estimate of the likelihood of loss. Such data
and facts are known colloquially as information, and we are interested in developing
analytical methods to assess the value of information in reducing the expected total
cost to the firm for insurance and for loss.
Insurance risk problems are a crucial aspect of enterprise risk management. Exam-
ples of insurance risk problems abound in every industry, and these issues are becoming
increasingly important in production and supply chain management as production sys-
tems become “lean” and the firm relies more heavily on critical distribution and pro-
duction capacity. Examples of unexpected events that disrupt production capability for
which insurance is typically considered include plant fires, labor actions, earthquakes,
supplier failures, and customs and transportation delays. As the enterprises concen-
trate on a more holistic framework for risk management, it is becoming increasingly
important to consider multiple effects of each unexpected event. In this regard, it is
crucial to determine the risk factors and their potential impacts on the enterprise.
We consider a single decision maker, the firm, whose objective is to determine
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the level of insurance purchased against a single factor that poses a risk of a loss. In
this chapter, we address the effect of information on decision making in the context
of optimizing the amount of coverage purchased, and thereby reducing expected cost.
In this regard, we are interested in determining the most attactive information bundle
among several alternatives, and in describing the set of information bundles that result
in decreased expected costs. There is no uniform preference scheme among decision
makers for different information bundles. Preference ranking of information bundles
depends on the shape of utility function and the probability distribution. Different
degrees of risk aversion may lead to different rankings of information bundles. However,
as Ohlson [30] and Willinger [39] showed, it is possible to obtain a uniform ranking
when the class of utility functions is appropriately reduced. In this chapter, we rank
information bundles of different specific forms for a given utility function. Based on
value of information results, we develop optimal insurance strategies for several different
loss models that are relevant in production operations scenarios.
V.1. Notation and Problem Definition
In a risky environment, a firm must decide whether or not to purchase an insurance
policy to protect its assets from loss, and if the decision is to purchase insurance,
the firm must decide the level of coverage. The firm has a concave utility function
u : R→ R and an initial wealth W . An insurance package is available at a unit price
q (≤ 1) which pays one unit per unit loss 1. The firm may obtain certain information
bundles prior to making the insurance decision.
Let (R,B, µ) be a probability space representing the risk that the firm has to
manage, and let X : Ω → R be a random variable mapping the states of the world
1Note that we use common monetary units (e.g., $, £, etc.) to represent unit loss,
unit price, and unit insurance coverage.
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into monetary outcomes. The random variable X denotes the level of monetary loss
that the firm faces. Information is taken as a σ-algebra of events; that is, given an
information bundle G ⊂ F , the firm is able to ascertain whether or not any of the
events in G have occured. Based on available information, the firm updates its beliefs
about the likelihood of loss. We assume that the information bundles obtained by the
firm are not necessarily possessed by the insurance company; hence, the terms of the
contract do not depend on the firm’s information. However, this private information
may induce the firm to change its decision about how much coverage to purchase, or
even whether to purchase coverage or not.
In the subsequent sections, we will consider several loss scenarios to determine an
optimal information and decision strategy.
V.2. Fixed Damage Level
We begin with a relatively simple scenario. Let us suppose initially that, if the
loss occurs, it is a fixed amount d. Then the relevant probability space is given by Let
0 ≤ α ≤ d be the units of coverage purchased, and denote the event that the damage
occurs by D ∈ F .
In the absence of information, the firm chooses the level of α that maximizes its
expected utility. Let α∗ be the optimum level of coverage. In this simple case,
X(ω) =

W − αq − d+ α when ω ∈ D,
W − αq when ω ∈ Dc.
Then α∗ can be expressed as
α∗ = argmaxα(1− µ(D)) · u(W − αq) + µ(D) · u(W − αq − d+ α).
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If α∗ > 0, it satisfies the first-order condition
µ(D)(1− q) · u′(W − α∗q − d+ α∗) = q(1− µ(D)) · u′(W − α∗q).
Now, we would like to determine the value of a particular information bundle
vis-a´-vis the level of insurance coverage purchased. Consider the simple information
bundle FA generated by A ∈ R; i.e., FA = {A,Ac,R, ∅}. Provided E[|u(X)|] < ∞,













= u(W − αq − d+ α) · µ(A ∩D) + u(W − αq) · µ(A ∩Dc),(5.1)
and∫
Ac
E[u(X)|FA]dµ = u(W − αq − d+ α) · µ(Ac ∩D) + u(W − αq) · µ(Ac ∩Dc). (5.2)
From 5.1 and 5.2, it follows that
E[u(X)|FA] =

u(W − αq − d+ α) · µ(D|A) + u(W − αq) · µ(Dc|A) ω ∈ A
u(W − αq − d+ α) · µ(D|Ac) + u(W − αq) · µ(Dc|Ac) ω ∈ Ac
Accordingly, the firm has two different problems to solve. When A occurs, all the points
in the sample space that belongs to event Ac becomes meaningles, so the firm updates
the probability of the event D according to this information. After the probabilities
are updated, the firm maximizes its expected utility
max
α
u(W − αq − d+ α) · µ(D|A) + u(W − αq) · µ(Dc|A)
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Similarly, when Ac occurs
max
α
u(W − αq − d+ α) · µ(D|Ac) + u(W − αq) · µ(Dc|Ac)













u′(W − αAcq − d+ αAc) ω ∈ A
c,
where αA and αAc are optimums when A and A
c occurs, respectively. In no information
case
E[u]|α=α∗ = µ(D) · u(W − α∗q − d+ α∗) + µ(Dc) · u(W − α∗q)
= [µ(D|A) · u(W − α∗q − d+ α∗) + µ(Dc|A) · u(W − α∗q)] · µ(A)






µ(D|A) · u(W − α∗q − d+ α∗) + µ(Dc|A) · u(W − α∗q) ω ∈ A
µ(D|Ac) · u(W − α∗q − d+ α∗) + µ(Dc|Ac) · u(W − α∗q) ω ∈ Ac
(5.3)
Two inequalities in 5.3 imply that E[maxαE[u|FA]] ≥ E[u]|α=α∗ . Thus the firm is never
worse off by obtaining more information for free. An information bundle is valuable
to the firm when the firm reaches a different decision about the level of coverage
purchased in the presence of the information. Otherwise, an information bundle is said
to be irrelevant. In other words, if the firm makes the same decision with or without
the information, the information is of no value to the firm.
The following proposition considers two special cases.
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Proposition 12 If A ⊂ D, then αA = d and αAc ≤ α∗, and if A ⊃ D, then αA ≥ α∗
and αAc = 0.




u(W − αq − d+ α) · µ(D|A) + u(W − αq) · µ(Dc|A) = max
α
u(W − αq − d+ α).
Since q ≤ 1, du/dα ≥ 0. Hence, the more the units of coverage the firm has, the higher
its utility, and it follows that αA = d. When A
c occurs, we have the usual conditions
for optimum. Since (µ(D)/µ(Dc)) ≥ (µ(D|Ac)/µ(Dc|Ac)), we have
u′(W − αAcq)
u′(W − αAcq − d+ αAc) ≤
u′(W − α∗q)
u′(W − α∗q − d+ α∗) .
Let
u′(W − αq)





−q · u′′(W − αq) · u′(W − αq − d+ α) + (q − 1) · u′′(W − αq − d+ α) · u′(W − αq)
(u′(W − αq − d+ α))2
Note that
−q · u′′(W − αq) · u′(W − αq− d+ α) + (q− 1) · u′′(W − αq− d+ α) · u′(W − αq) ≥ 0,
which suggests that dg(α)/dα ≥ 0. From here we may conclude that α∗ ≥ αAc , which
demonstrates the first claim of the proposition.
Now assume that A ⊃ D. When Ac occurs, optimization problem becomes
max
α









Using the FOC for optimum, we then conclude that αA ≥ α∗. ¤
Intuitively, the proposition demonstrates that when A is a subset of D, the firm
will be able to conclude that when A occurs damage will surely obtain, and since q ≤ 1,
the optimal decision for the firm is to purchase full coverage. On the other hand, when
Ac occurs, the likelihood of loss is smaller, and hence, the optimal decision of the firm
is to reduce the level of coverage from the original case with no information. However,
when D is a subset of event A, the optimal level of coverage is expected to move in
the opposite direction. When A occurs, the likelihood of the shock increases, so the
firm should purchase more coverage. Instead, when Ac occurs, the firm learns with
certainty that the shock will not obtain, so no coverage is purchased at all.
V.3. Random Damage Level
A more realistic case is where the level of damage is random. For mathematical
ease, we would like to consider the case where d : Ω → R is a continuous uniform
random variable with range [0,W/n]. Other distributions can be assumed too, how-
ever, the computations can easily become complicated and this complication does not
add much to the demonstration of the value of information. Here, n is a parameter
determining how influential the maximum damage is on the wealth level of the decision
maker. Assume that the decision maker’s utility function is u(x) = x− 1
2W
x2, in which
x is the level of wealth. It is easy to check that this function satisfies the properties
of a utility function. The objective is to decide the fraction of the damage that will
be restored back to the decisiom maker by the insurance company in case a damage
obtains. Hence, different from the earlier case where damage was fixed, α is the fraction
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of damage covered. We assume that the cost of coverage is, c(α) = αW/b. The higher
the value of b, the cheaper the coverage is. We assume that b ≥ n, so that the full
coverage never costs strictly greater than any possible level of damage.
Again, we would like to rank simple information bundles of the form FAa =













First, we would like to determine the level of coverage purchased when information















We maximize this with respect to α. After taking the first order conditions, the un-




































































Since αAa , αAca ∈ [0, 1], we need to analyze how αu,Aa and αu,Aca behave for different
values of a. The behavior depends on whether a is greater than W/b or not, as the
following theorem suggests.
Theorem 7 Suppose that the decision maker with a utility function u(x) learns the
damage level in advance. Then he purchases no coverage when d < W/b and full
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coverage when d ≥ W/b.
Proof: The decision maker’s utility is u(W − c(α) − d + αd) = u(W (1 − (α/b)) −
d(1− α)). Since du/dα = u′(W (1− (α/b))− d(1− α)) · (d− (W/b)), the result follows
after observing that u′(W (1− (α/b))− d(1− α)) ≥ 0 ¤
In light this theorem, we will assume first that a < W/b. From Theorem 7, we
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implying that αu,Aa ≤ 0. Since E[vα(X)|FAa](ω) is a quadratic function of α for ω ∈ A
and d2(E[vα|FAa](ω))/dα2 = − denominator ≤ 0, αu,Aa is the unique maximizer. Con-
sequently the constrained maximum is attained at αAa = 0. The following proposition
gives the value of αAca under different circumstances.
Proposition 13 Assume a < W/b. When Aca occurs, the optimal level of coverage is
as follows,





0 : 0 ≤ a ≤ a˜
αu,Aca : a˜ ≤ a ≤ a¯




n ≤ b ≤ 2n:
αAca =
 αu,Aca : 0 ≤ a ≤ a¯1 : a¯ ≤ a < W
b
And, for b ≥ 2n: αAca = 1




































Proof: Denote the denominator of 5.5 by da and the numerator by na. We will
first show that da is always positive. The value of a that minimizes da, keeping other











2 ≥ 0, so amin is a minimizer. However, for b ≥ 3n, amin ≤ 0, so da
is actually minimized at a = 0. Hence, for b ≥ 3n,








− 1) ≥ 0.





























it suffices to see that da|a=amin ≥ 0 at b = n. We have da|a=amin,b=n = 0, so da ≥ 0 for
n ≤ b ≤ 3n. Hence, the denominator is always positive. This implies that αu,Aca is
always a unique unconstrained maximizer.
We need to analyze the numerator. Observe that for b ≥ 2n, na ≥ da, hence the
constrained maximum, αAca = 0. Now, assume that
3
2
n ≤ b ≤ 2n. Then na ≥ da























so na ≥ 0. From here it follows that αAca = αu,Aca for a ≤ a¯. Finally, assume that
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n ≤ b ≤ 3
2
n. It is still true that na ≥ da for a ≥ a¯. However, na becomes negative for

























From here, the result follows. ¤
The other case we need to consider is a ≥ W/b. We know from Theorem 7 that
the optimal level of α is 1 when Aca occurs. As earlier, one can verify this result from
the expression of the unconstrained optimum. The following proposition tells us about
the optimal level of coverage when Aa occurs















≤ a ≤ W
n
Proof: Let na and da be the numerator and the denominator of the 5.4 respectively.
First of all da is minimized at a = 3W/2b and da|a= 3W
2b
= 0. This implies da ≥ 0.
Furthermore, na ≤ 0 for a ≤ 3W/2b. Thus, αAa = 0 for a ≤ 3W/2b. One can also
verify very easily that na ≥ da for a ≥ 2W/b. Hence, the result follows. ¤
One remark that we should immediately make about the proposition above is that
it is never optimal to get full coverage if W/n < 2W/b. This case occurs when the
coverage is very costly, and the maximum level of damage is low.
V.4. Information with Increased Precision
Another problem related with the previous example is to compare information
bundles of some increased precision. It is possible purchase information bundles of the
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form Fr = σ(A1,r, ..., Ai,r, ..., Ar,r) where Ai,r = [W/(rn(i − 1)),W/rni]. The sample
space for level of damage is partitioned into intervals of equal length, and the decision
maker learns which interval the actual level of damage belongs in advance when he
buys the information bundle. After acquiring the information, the optimal level of
coverage can be determined easily in most cases from Theorem 7. The only interesting








The form of the utility function and the distribution of the damage remains the
same in this new setting. Then, when Ai occurs, the expected utility for the decision










(2i− 1)− (1− α)
2W
6r2n2
(3i2 − 3i+ 1)
Again, from first order conditions, the unconstrained optimum is

























Corollary 7 (i) If W/b ≥ iW/rn, then αi,r = 0 (ii) If W/b ≤ (i − 1)W/rn, then
αi,r = 1.
Proof: In the first case, the decision maker learns that the damage level is less than
W/b and in the second case, he learns instead that the damage level is greater than
W/b. The result then follows from Theorem 7. ¤
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holds. Let k be a real number satisfying b = krn. Then, the level of coverage when









Then the optimal level of coverage when Ai occurs is as follows,
αi,r =

0 : k ∈ [1
i
, k¯]
αu,r : k ∈ [k¯, kˆ]










Proof: Let nr and dr be the numerator and the denominator of 5.6 respectively.
First, we would like to see whether the denominator is always positive or not. Assume











Next assume that W/b ∈ [(i− 1)W/rn, iW/rn] for some 1 < i ≤ r. Then, after taking









Finally, dr|b=bmin = W 2/12r2n2 ≥ 0, so dr is always positive.
Next,
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so the numerator is monotonically increasing in k. Then solving the inequality nr|b=krn ≤
0, we obtain that nr|b=krn is negative for k ≤ k¯. Furthermore nr ≥ dr for k ≥ kˆ. The
result follows from these observations. ¤
V.5. Numerical Results
In this section, we will discuss the effects of changes in the level of parameters in
the both models related to random damage level. First, we will present the results of
simulations on the model where we only consider information bundles formed by the
events of the form Aa = {d ≤ a}. Three parameters are crucial here: a, b and n.
a determines how the sample space is partitioned after acquisition of the information
bundle. From Theorem 7, we know that the main concern of he decision maker is
to learn whether the actual damage level, d, is greater than W/b or not. Thus, the
relation between a and b is particularly important for the value of information.
In what follows, we fix the level of wealth at 200 and fixed the value of n at 4.
Keeping the values of W and n, we get a picture of how the value of information
behaves as a function of b as a assumes different values. The numerical results support
the conclusion that the maximum value of information is attained at a = W/b, for
each value of b. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the value of information for different values
of b. As the level of a approaches from 0 to W/b, the value of information amplifies
whereas as the level of a drifts away from W/b, the value of information diminishes. It
is possible to observe that on both ends of the spectrum, as a drifts further away from
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Fig. 5. Value of Information as a Function of “a” for Different Fixed Values of “b”.
W/b, information becomes valueless. This is mainly due to noise factors that do not
provide a better description of the environment compared to the no information case.
As a result, the decision maker has no reason to manipulate the initial decision on the
level of coverage purchased.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the value of information for different values of a. The
shape of the graphs in each figure remains the same; however at different fixed values
of a, the overal magnitude of the value of information differs. There is one intuitive
explanation to this change in the overall magnitude. The increase in the value of b
is good for the decision maker because the cost of coverage declines as b increases.
Hence, the utility level of the decision maker is positively affected from an increase
in the level of b. As a result of the decline in the cost, the decision maker purchases
more coverage. The cost of making a wrong decision declines, hence the information
becomes less valuable to the decision maker. The second effect is stronger for greater
values of b. The behavior of the value of information as a function of a for different
fixed values of b can be attributed to this. Based on the results, the most valuable
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Fig. 6. Value of Information as a Function of “a” for Different Fixed Values of “b”.
information bundle among this class is FW
b
.
The evolution of the behavior of the value of information in Figures 5, 6, 7 and
8 has a similar picture for different values of W and n. The value of information is a
always maximum at a = W/b. Accordingly, the changes in W and n only changes the
value of a that the value of information attains the maximum value.
The support of the distribution of the level of damage is controlled by the parame-
ter n. As n increases, the support shrinks, high levels of damage fail to be a possibility.
Not surprisingly, this induces the decision maker to reduce his purchase of the coverage.
At high levels of n, no coverage is purchased at all, even when information is obtained.
Thus, the value of information tends to zero. In Figure 9, we have taken the values for
W and b as 2000 and 20 respectively. One observation is that the value of information
increases until a particular value of n is reached. Furthermore, this increase is linear.
For smaller values of n, the decision maker purchases full coverage when he obtains no
information. When some information bundle is acquired, if a ≤ W/b, then his decision
remains the same for small values of n, i.e. purchase no coverage when A occurs and
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Fig. 7. Value of Information as a Function of “b” for Different Fixed Values of “a”.
full coverage when Ac occurs. As a result, the value of information changes linearly
as the likelihoods of A and Ac change linearly with n, not because the decision maker
comes up with a new decision when these events occur. After some threshold value, the
decision maker begins to reduce his purchase of coverage in no information case and
this linear relation is lost. For high values of n, the decision maker reduces the level of
coverage purchased even further, and the value of information hits zero when the value
of n is high enough to make sure that he purchases no coverage even when Ac occurs.
When a ≥ W/b, similar behavior is observed. In that case, for high values of n, the the
decision maker takes advantage of further information when Ac occurs. The possibility
of this advantage diminishes as n increases, so does the value of information.
Next, we would like to analyze the second model numerically. The parameter r
controls how precise the information is. Greater values of r refers to higher precision.
The natural question is to see if it is possible to find a monotonic relation between
the value of information and r. Such a relation fails to exist, because the information
bundle with a higher precision does not necessarily contain the information in the
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Fig. 8. Value of Information as a Function of “b” for Different Fixed Values of “a”.
Fig. 9. Value of Information as a Function of “n” for Different Fixed Values of “a”.
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Table 9. Value of Information with Doubled Precision.
W n b r Value of information
100 4 6 2 0.217014
100 4 6 4 0.254991
100 4 6 8 0.26652
100 4 6 16 0.269148
100 4 6 32 0.269837
100 4 6 64 0.270005
bundle with a lower precision. Both bundles may provide different information, none
of which strictly contains the other. The information bundle with a higher precision
might exclude some crucial information that exist in a bundle with a lower precision.
Table 9 illustrates two cases where a monotonic relation is observed, simply because the
information bundle with a higher precision includes the bundle with a lower precision.
On the other hand, Table 10 illustrates that increased precision does not necessarily
imply higher value of information.
The behavior of the value of information as a function of b depends on the fixed
values of r, n and W . However, to observe the general behavior, it suffices to fix W
and r and observe the behavior for different values of n, because the relation mainly
depends on where W/b fits in the partition of [0,W/n] by the information bundle with
precision r. In Figure 10, W = 2000 and r = 8. When W/b fits in the very first
interval in the partition, information may not be valuable. In all the graphs in Figure
10, the value of information converges to zero as W/b gets small and the decision taken
by the decision maker is the same as in no information case even when it is learned
that the level of damage is not going to be high. Another interesting remark is that
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Table 10. Value of Information with Increasing Precision.
W n b r Value of information
100 2 7 2 0.0294349
100 2 7 3 0.185815
100 2 7 4 0.189998
100 2 7 5 0.170748
100 2 7 6 0.185815
100 2 7 7 0.194363
100 2 7 8 0.189998
Fig. 10. Value of Information as a Function of “b” for Different Fixed Values of “n”.
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as n larger, the value of information tends to increase as b increases until it reaches a
peak point and then starts to diminish, whereas for smaller values of n, the value of
information diminishes without revealing any increasing trend initially. The graphs for
smaller values of n are a little bit misleading because in Figure 10 we don’t allow b to
take values less than 16. This is because we compare different graphs for different levels
of n and in our analysis we never allow b > n for in that case analysis becomes trivial.
In fact, the value of information has an increasing trend for smaller values of b and
after reaching the peak point, it gradually diminishes. As W/b moves to the middle of
[0,W/b], the decision maker purchases partial coverage. Then the information becomes
more valuable for the decision maker updates his initial decision when any of the events
in the information bundle occurs. Therefore, we observe an increase in the value of
information as b increases for smaller values of b.
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CHAPTER VI
VALUE OF INFORMATION FOR CORPORATE INSURANCE
DECISIONS
In the current era of globalization, multinational firms continue to expand into
emerging global markets. In order to bring better service to different markets, each of
which offers high potential profits, firms build new facilities in economically develop-
ing countries. Accordingly, the enterprises encounter many operational and financial
decisions in an unfamiliar environment. Information plays a crucial role in reducing
uncertainty in this unfamiliar environment, and can help the enterprise to eliminate
some unnecessary risks and to identify the likelihood and severity of risks retained.
The calculation of fair premium and determination of how much insurance is required
against a specified risk is possible if the decision makers can form a clear picture of
risks to which the enterprise is exposed.
In this chapter, we focus on determining the value of information in making in-
surance decisions about physical hazard risks. The risks involve any physical events
that would limit the capacity of the facility for a specified period time, e.g. fire, flood,
utility outage, earthquake etc. These events may not impose a full restriction on the
production capacity of the facility. Rather, they may remove a percentage of the avail-
able capacity based on the severity of the risk event. We take the capacity as fixed for
the whole facility, ignoring the production and inventory decisions within the facility
that actually determine how the capacity is utilized. The total capacity of the facility
is allocated to a single product that serves a single market.
We consider the problem of assessing the value of information in insuring physical
risks for a single facility that serves a single market and is exposed to multiple risk
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factors. There is a certain cost per unit of item delivered. The price of each item
depends on the market conditions and the costs of item delivery. The criticality of
operations in the facility depends on the demand patterns for each product in the
markets served, the speed of recovery from the impacts of each risk factor, the revenue
goals and the strategic goals to expand the market share. While physical property
damage may occur at a facility due to a risk event, the business interruption due to
a reduction in capacity can have far more financially severe consequences. The enter-
prise should incorporate the business interruption risk in their property and casualty
insurance decisions. Therefore, we use lost sales and lost production capability as a
proxy to measure the potential loss due to each risk factor.
VI.1. The Model
We consider a risk process consisting of two independent types of risk events each
of which reduces the capacity at the facility to a fraction of the full capacity. When
the facility operates at its full capacity, it can produce C units of a single product
per unit time. Therefore, the facility is able to produce Ct units in t time units. We
assume that the production serves a single market and the sale price of the product is
p. The cost of producing a single item is c. This cost includes all the production and
and distributional costs associated with a single item. Therefore, the firm is exposed
to an economic loss of (p − c) dollars per unit of unsatisfied demand. The main risk
that each risk event imposes on the facility is the lost demand due to a reduction in
the capacity. In this vein, we ignore the physical damage on the facility in insurance
decisions.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space which represents the set of states of the world
and the probability law that governs this abstract space. All the random phenomenon
in this model is defined on this probability triple. We will assume F includes all the
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singleton subsets of Ω. The uncertainty in the model is due to stochastic severity level
from a risk event and the time it takes for the next risk event to hit the facility. When
the facility is hit by a risk event of type j, it enters a fixed recovery period of Sj. It is
assumed that a risk event of the same type cannot hit the facility during the recovery
period.
Definition 10 The risk process is the stochastic tuple {Xjn, Rjn}j=1,2;n∈{−∞,...,−1,0,1,..,mj},
where Xjn ∈ (−∞, 1], Rjn ∈ [0, 1], and
mj = max {k : k · Sj ≤ 1}
Xjn, n > 0 : Time of the n
th risk event of type j after time t = 0.
Xjn, n < 0 : Time of the (−n+ 1)st risk event of type j before time t = 0.
Rjn : Ω→ [0, 1] : The fractional remaining capacity left when nth risk event of type
j hits the facility.
The decision to purchase insurance is taken at time t = 0. Hence, we count the
risk events from the origin, t = 0. The tuples that are negatively enumerated form the
history of the process whereas the positively enumerated tuples forms the risks that
the firm transfers to the insurance company during the contract horizon. The time
between each risk event includes the fixed recovery time from the earlier risk event and
the time to next risk event after the facility recovers.
During the recovery period, the production rate is reduced by 100 · (1 − Rjn)%.
We define {P (t), t ≥ 0} to be the production rate process where P (t) ∈ [0, C]. Each
sample path of {P (t), t ≥ 0} is a step function with finite number of jumps in any
bounded set at risk event epochs and recovery epochs. We assume that the facility sets
P (t) = C when there is no recovery operation from a risk event. When a risk event
with fractional capacity level Rjn arrives at time t, the capacity is reduced to R
j
n ·P (t−).
It is possible that a risk event of type j arrives while the facility is recovering from
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Fig. 11. A Sample Path for the Production Rate and Arrival of Risk Events.
capacity levels from both risk events. We can express P (t) as
P (t) = C · (
∞∑
j=1
R1j · 1{t−S1<X1j≤t}) · (
∞∑
j=1
R2j · 1{t−S2<X2j≤t}). (6.1)
A sample path for P (t) in 6.1 is displayed in Figure 11.
The insurance company assumes the risk of inability to fulfill the demand due to
reduction in capacity. Thus, the insurance company is not responsible from unsatisfied
demand due to insufficient full capacity. Without loss of generality, the contract horizon
spans only one time period. The production schedule is made before the contract
horizon with a target production rate of D. If we set C ≥ D, then there is no risk
of deviating from the target production rate as long as the facility operates under full















Fig. 12. An Ilustration of Coinsurance Contracts as a Function of α.
Note the implicit assumption that the total demand of D during the contract horizon
can only be fulfilled from production during that period, i.e. inventory level at the
beginning of the contract horizon is zero.
The insurance company offers a coinsurance contract (pi(·), α) with zero deductible
and α is the fraction of the actual deviation from the target production level that the
insurance company guarantees to pay. For example, if there is a damage of $5 million
and α = 0.8, then the insurance company pays $4 million. Figure 12 illustrates the
relation between amount recovered and amount of loss as a function of α. The level of
premium pi(·) depends on the risk pattern over the contract horizon, α, the safety load
factor θ and the cost per unit of lost production κ. The insurance premium takes the
form
pi(α, κ, θ) = (1 + θ) · α · κ · E [max (D −
∫ 1
0
P (t)dt, 0)]. (6.2)
Note that pi(·) is linear in α and θ. The decision maker must choose the optimal
level of the risk sharing percentage, α for the insurance contract given an information
endowment. An information endowment involves all the events that the decision maker
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observes before making the final decision. In particular, an information endowment
can include historical data on risk events experienced by the firm making the decision
or other firms operating in a similar environment. Information endowment can also
include severity assessments if a specific risk should occur. This information can either
be gathered internally by risk experts, or purchased by external experts. The decision
maker may observe these events before making the decision. In this chapter, we focus
on the insurance contract decision, and also ask the question of obtaining the“right”
information endowment to design a “better” insurance contract. We will have more to
say about modeling the information endowment in what follows.
The level of wealth which includes all the assets of the firm is denoted by W . Let
u(x) : R → R be the utility function of the firm. We will assume u(·) is concave,
increasing and exhibiting non-increasing degree of risk aversion. This last assumption
states that a decision maker with a higher wealth cares less about losing a fixed amount
than a decision maker with a lower wealth. We only consider the risks that can be
translated into financial terms, so the firm’s utility is assumed to depend only on money,
i.e., net profitability or some other suitable financial metric.
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Let F∗ be the set of complete sub-σ-fields of F . Information is a collection of
events which is also a subset F∗, hereafter called an information bundle. The firm has
an option to purchase information bundles before time t = 0, i.e. before making the
decision. The history of the risk process in time interval (t1, t2], where t1, t2 ∈ (−∞, 1],
is summarized in the information bundle F(t1,t2]. Conceptually, information bundles of
the form F(t1,t2] provide complete information about the process in a given time period.
The history of the risk process up to time t is recorded in F(−∞,t] which we denote in
short by Ft. Note that, {Ft}t∈(−∞,1] is an increasing collection of σ-algebras.
However, complete information about the period [0, 1] is not available and it might
be costly to gather complete information about the history of the process in some time
period (t1, t2] for t1, t2 ≤ 0. In practice, most of the available information bundles
provide partial information. We will let Fa(t1,t2] be the set of available information
bundles that contain information related with the behavior of the risk process in (t1, t2].
If F(t1,t2] ∈ Fa(t1,t2], then we say that history of the process can be completely revealed.
The set of all available information bundles is Fa = ∪t1≤t2;t1,t2∈(−∞,1]Fa(t1,t2]. A very
simple element of Fa(t1,t2] can be an information bundle generated by a single event. For
example, if the decision maker would like to learn whether the severity of risk events
of type j in time interval (t1, t2] lies in [r1, r2] or not, then he needs to purchase the
information bundle generated by the event A = {ω : Rji ∈ [r1, r2] ∀i s.t. Xji ∈ (t1, t2]}.
Clearly, σ(A) ⊂ F(t1,t2], and σ(A) ∈ Fa(t1,t2]. An important property of Fa is that if
G1,G2 ∈ Fa, then G1 ∨ G2 ∈ Fa.
There are several different approaches to assess the value of risk information. It
has been shown that all the approaches do not lead to the same preference ranking of
information bundles. We will employ the expected utility approach, which ranks the
information bundles based on the marginal increase in expected utility after acquiring
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a particular information bundle. In this regard, the value of information is defined as
V (G, u) = E {max
α
(P (Ecd|G) · u(W − pi + (p− c) ·D − q(G)) + P (Ed|G)·






{P (Ecd) · u(W − pi + (p− c) ·D) + P (Ed) · E [u(W − pi+




where q(G) is the cost of information bundle G ∈ Fa.
Following 6.4, the decision maker’s problem is stated as
supG∈FaV (G, u)
Hence, the decision maker chooses the information bundle that will yield the maximal
increase in the expected utility with respect to the baseline case of no information.
VI.2. Numerical Results
As we mentioned in Chapter V, it is very difficult to obtain analytical results in
insurance decision problems. Even if we assume an exponentially distributed amount
of time between the end of recovery from a risk event and the next risk event, the
computations are quite complex. Therefore, we simulate a number of scenarios to see
the behavior of value of information with respect to its determinants. We consider a









)2 : x < 0
as in Chapter IV. The time between the end of revovery from a risk event and the
next risk event is assumed to be exponentially distributed, with different rates for
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Table 11. Parameter Values for the Simulation.
Price 5 λ1 2 Wealth 10000
Cost 3 λ2 5 Recovery Period 1 0.1
Demand 9000 Safety Load 0 Recovery Period 2 0.05
each type j, denoted by λj. Without loss of generality, we assume that the contract
period is one time unit. The decision maker is assumed to know the recovery status of
the production process at time 0. Under all the scenarios we discuss, the production
process is assumed to face no recovery at time 0 from a risk event that occured prior
to time 0.
We consider information that pertains to different periods during the contract
horizon. Specific information bundles that we consider are F r,j(0,t] each of which is
generated by the event Ar,j(0,t] = {ω : Rji ≥ r ∀i st Xji ∈ (0, t]}. In other words,
information about the event Ar,j(0,t] answers the question of whether a risk event of type
j occurs in (0, t] or not, and if a risk event occurs, whether the severity exceeds r or not.
Note that, r denotes the fractional remaining capacity, so the decision maker learns
if the fractional decrease in the production rate is within a certain range or not even
when a risk event hits the facility. In this respect, A1,j(0,t] does not give any information
about the risk event should a risk event occur, so this type of an event simply answers
the question of whether an event occurs of type j in (0, t].
The parameter values that we used in the simulation is illustrated in Table 11.
In the following sections, we discuss the effect of changes of some of these parameters
on the value of information. The maximum production rate is taken as 10000, so the
demand is certainly satisfied in case no risk event hits the facility. Under this parameter
setting the decision maker decides to purchase full coverage, attaining expected utility
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Table 12. Value of Information about A1,1(0,t] as a Function of t.
t VOI t VOI t VOI t VOI
0.05 0 0.3 0.456768 0.55 0.590742 0.8 0.487168
0.1 0.025389 0.35 0.509922 0.6 0.587552 0.85 0.465086
0.15 0.172653 0.4 0.546433 0.65 0.580671 0.9 0.44066
0.2 0.29145 0.45 0.572242 0.7 0.567853 0.95 0.4136
0.25 0.384204 0.5 0.585856 0.75 0.549918 1 0.371465
of 162.105. Note that, all the simulations are replicated so as to achieve convergence
of each result at least in two decimal places.
VI.2.1. Information on the Time of Risk Events
We first discuss the the value of information about events A1,1(0,t], A
1,2
(0,t] for different
values of t. Tables 12 and 13 illusrate the behavior with respect to risk events 1 and 2
respectively. Maximum value of information is attained when t ∈ (0.5, 0.6) for the first
type of risk event and when t ∈ (0.2, 0.3). For smaller values of t, information is not
valuable as the decision maker still purchases full coverage after learning that there is
no risk event for such a short period of time. For relatively lower values of t, the value
of information has an increasing trend simply because the decision maker is able to
reduce uncertainty for a longer period of time. Note that, the decision maker changes
the decision when he learns that no risk event occurs in that specified time period.
Hence, information becomes valuable as the decision maker reduces the purchase of
insurance. As t gets larger, the likelihood of this valuable piece decreases, so value
of information decreases after attaining some maximum value. The reason is that we
evaluate the value of information a priori, and the event that induces a decision change
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Table 13. Value of Information about A1,2(0,t] as a Function of t.
t VOI t VOI t VOI t VOI
0.05 0 0.3 0.221439 0.55 0.12512 0.8 0.04905
0.1 0.062521 0.35 0.208626 0.6 0.10625 0.85 0.03997
0.15 0.157648 0.4 0.188865 0.65 0.089193 0.9 0.032747
0.2 0.205712 0.45 0.15771 0.7 0.07323 0.95 0.027864
0.25 0.223573 0.5 0.145796 0.75 0.062088 1 0.022106
becomes less likely. For example, for the first risk type, the value of information about
the event A1,1(0,0.9] is less than that of A
1,1
(0,0.8] although the decision maker attains a higher
expected utility after learning that A1,1(0,0.9] occurs rather than A
1,1
(0,0.8] occurs. The same
explanation applies to the second risk event, too.
If we compare the value of information with respect to two different types of risk
events, we observe that the value of information is greater for the second risk event
type for small values of t. This is not the case for larger values of t. The decision maker
is always better of after learning that A1,2(0,t] occurs rather than A
1,1
(0,t] occurs because the
second event exposes a more frequent risk. However, the likelihood of no risk event in
a specific time period is considerably lower as t increases, so the decision maker prefers
learning about the less frequent risk hoping that there is a greater chance of changing
the original decision. Since the second risk event occurs 2.5 times more frequent on
the the average than the first risk event, the second effect becomes dominant for fairly
low values of t.
VI.2.2. Incorporation of Information on the Severity of Risk Events
In this section, we suppose that the decision maker may get information about
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Table 14. Value of Information about Ar,1(0,t] as a Function of r and t.
t r VOI t r VOI t r VOI
0.25 0.2 0 0.5 0.2 0.0546 0.75 0.2 0.220506
0.25 0.35 0.01537 0.5 0.35 0.28914 0.75 0.35 0.485925
0.25 0.5 0.139744 0.5 0.5 0.450696 0.75 0.5 0.626705
0.25 0.65 0.24435 0.5 0.65 0.550528 0.75 0.65 0.672948
0.25 0.8 0.327278 0.5 0.8 0.597733 0.75 0.8 0.652224
0.25 1 0.384204 0.5 1 0.585856 0.75 1 0.549918
the risk events. The value of information is increasing in r for small values of r,
whereas for larger values of r, it is decreasing in r. Tables 14 and 15 illustrate the
behavior of the value of information for risk events of type 1 and 2, respectively. The
decision maker is always better off after learning that Ar,j(0,t] occurs for larger values of
r. The decision maker’s original decision is to purchase full coverage. The only way
to change the decision is learning either no risk event occurs in some given time frame
or learning that even if risk events occur, they are not going to remove a big fraction
of the capacity anyway. For sufficiently small r, the decision maker may choose to
abandon insurance. However, the likelihood of Ar,j(0,t] is decreasing with r and t, hence
as we evaluate information a priori the positive effect of Ar,j(0,t] is lessened.
Suppose Ar,j(0,t] occurs. The decision maker still purchases full coverage for small
values of r and t. This implies that the value of information is zero. It is very probable
that Ar,j(0,t] occurs for small values of r and t. Therefore, the optimal action when A
r,j
(0,t]
occurs is likely to be chosen when no information is obtained. For large values r and
t, this is not the case as, so the information becomes valuable.
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Table 15. Value of Information about Ar,2(0,t] as a Function of r and t.
t r VOI t r VOI t r VOI
0.25 0.2 0 0.5 0.2 0.079618 0.75 0.2 0.19581
0.25 0.35 0.04241 0.5 0.35 0.22795 0.75 0.35 0.289332
0.25 0.5 0.14014 0.5 0.5 0.271425 0.75 0.5 0.26125
0.25 0.65 0.19913 0.5 0.65 0.25875 0.75 0.65 0.193563
0.25 0.8 0.226968 0.5 0.8 0.2166 0.75 0.8 0.126788
0.25 1 0.223573 0.5 1 0.145796 0.75 1 0.062088
VI.2.3. Effect of Profit, Wealth Level and Safety Load on the Value of
Information
In this analysis, we ignore all the physical damage to the facility when a risk
event is observed. The facility is insured against loss sales. Therefore, the profit of
the product produced in the facility increases the loss should a risk event occur. As
illustrated in Tables 16 and 17, the value of information increases as price increases.
The decision maker is more willing to reduce uncertainty as the profitability of the
product increases. Note that, the evaluations are made only on events A1,j(0,t], i.e., the
decision maker does not learn any information about the severity of the risk events.
This line of reasoning does not work for very profitable products, though. As the
prices increase, the decision maker favors purchasing of insurance even when he learns
that no event occurs in a particular time period. In this case, the value of information
should decrease. Tables 16 and 17, does not reflect this, as this second effect starts
dominating in a slow manner. Note that, the profitability of the product does not have
an effect on the relation between t and the value of information.
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Table 16. Value of Information about A1,1(0,t] as a Function of Price and t.
t p VOI t p VOI t p VOI t p VOI
0.2 5 0.29145 0.4 5 0.546433 0.6 5 0.587552 0.8 5 0.487168
0.2 8 0.50853 0.4 8 0.973432 0.6 8 1.050791 0.8 8 0.950208
0.2 10 0.61372 0.4 10 1.183115 0.6 10 1.277444 0.8 10 1.155844
0.2 18 0.92594 0.4 18 1.797347 0.6 18 1.943858 0.8 18 1.759824
0.2 30 1.25759 0.4 30 2.44705 0.6 30 2.649703 0.8 30 2.398952
0.2 50 1.66964 0.4 50 3.255699 0.6 50 3.526817 0.8 50 3.193216
0.2 80 2.14065 0.4 80 4.188272 0.6 80 4.534565 0.8 80 4.106862
0.2 100 2.40463 0.4 100 4.705071 0.6 100 5.098037 0.8 100 4.6157
In this document, we have mentioned several times that the value of information
does not have any general monotonic relation with its determinants. In this respect,
we do not claim that the monotonic relationships that are illustrated in tables can be
generalized in any manner. Tables 18 and 19 shows that value of information about
events A1,j(0,t] is decreasing in wealth. As the decision maker displays decreasing risk
aversion, the loss becomes less hazardous for the decision maker as wealth increases.
However, we need a more thorough analysis to see how general this conclusion is.
The cost of insurance depends on the safety load. In the original parameter set-
tings, safety load is zero, which implies that the insurer is risk neutral. As safety load
increases, the risk neutrality is lost and the insurer charges higher than the fair pre-
mium. In this respect, safety load also controls how risk averse the insurer is. Clearly,
as the cost of insurance increases, the decision maker reduces the level of coverage.
However, this does not necessarily imply that the value of information is lower. This
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Table 17. Value of Information about A1,2(0,t] as a Function of Price and t.
t p VOI t p VOI t p VOI t p VOI
0.2 5 0.205712 0.4 5 0.188865 0.6 5 0.10625 0.8 5 0.04905
0.2 8 0.361376 0.4 8 0.336555 0.6 8 0.1899 0.8 8 0.08775
0.2 10 0.437184 0.4 10 0.40878 0.6 10 0.2308 0.8 10 0.106704
0.2 18 0.660192 0.4 18 0.621405 0.6 18 0.3512 0.8 18 0.162414
0.2 30 0.896816 0.4 30 0.846315 0.6 30 0.47865 0.8 30 0.221418
0.2 50 1.190848 0.4 50 1.126035 0.6 50 0.63705 0.8 50 0.294678
0.2 80 1.529408 0.4 80 1.447605 0.6 80 0.819 0.8 80 0.378954
0.2 100 1.718928 0.4 100 1.62729 0.6 100 0.92065 0.8 100 0.42597
is illustrated in Table 20. As the decision maker purchases partial coverage when





Therefore, information becomes very valuable. For higher values of the safety load,
the decision maker reduces the coverage to zero, no matter which of these two events
occur, so information is valueless. The second effect of costly insurance becomes effec-
tive when the safety load is high enough to induce the decision maker to purchase no
coverage when no information is acquired. A similar picture ensues for information on
A1,2(0,t].
Our analysis is far from being complete. While it is not possible to guess in
advance which information bundle is the most valuable for the decision maker, it can
easily be argued that information becomes very valuable when the decision maker
initially purchases partial coverage. However, in most cases, the decisions are clear cut
in that the decision maker purchases either full or no coverage.
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Table 18. Value of Information about A1,1(0,t] as a Function of Wealth and t.
t w VOI t w VOI t w VOI
0.25 1000 0.456924 0.5 1000 0.711712 0.75 1000 0.671007
0.25 5000 0.420564 0.5 5000 0.646944 0.75 5000 0.608344
0.25 10000 0.380204 0.5 10000 0.585856 0.75 10000 0.549918
0.25 15000 0.356328 0.5 15000 0.53912 0.75 15000 0.505541
0.25 20000 0.333906 0.5 20000 0.502688 0.75 20000 0.470753
0.25 30000 0.298152 0.5 30000 0.446752 0.75 30000 0.418125
0.25 50000 0.252702 0.5 50000 0.37536 0.75 50000 0.350556
0.25 80000 0.211494 0.5 80000 0.3128 0.75 80000 0.291684
0.25 100000 0.192708 0.5 100000 0.284832 0.75 100000 0.265593
Table 19. Value of Information about A1,2(0,t] as a Function of Wealth and t.
t w VOI t w VOI t w VOI
0.25 1000 0.26691 0.5 1000 0.17712 0.75 1000 0.07572
0.25 5000 0.245098 0.5 5000 0.160884 0.75 5000 0.068664
0.25 10000 0.223573 0.5 10000 0.145796 0.75 10000 0.062088
0.25 15000 0.206927 0.5 15000 0.134234 0.75 15000 0.05712
0.25 20000 0.193725 0.5 20000 0.125132 0.75 20000 0.053184
0.25 30000 0.172774 0.5 30000 0.111192 0.75 30000 0.047232
0.25 50000 0.146083 0.5 50000 0.093398 0.75 50000 0.039624
0.25 80000 0.122262 0.5 80000 0.077818 0.75 80000 0.032976
0.25 100000 0.111356 0.5 100000 0.070848 0.75 100000 0.030048
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Table 20. Value of Information about A1,1(0,t] as a Function of Safety Load and t.
t safety load VOI t safety load VOI t safety load VOI
0.25 0 0.384 0.5 0 0.586 0.75 0 0.55
0.25 0.1 0.601 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.75 0.1 0.602
0.25 0.2 0.434 0.5 0.2 0.43 0.75 0.2 0.27
0.25 0.3 0.263 0.5 0.3 0.157 0.75 0.3 0
0.25 0.4 0.092 0.5 0.4 0 0.75 0.4 0




In this chapter, we present a summary of the research and highlight the contribu-
tions of our results. We also provide a discussion on possible future directions.
VII.1. Summary and Contributions
Every decision is made in the light of some information bundle that is possessed
at the decision epoch. The primary objective of this research is to determine the value
of information bundles available to an expected utility maximizer and to determine
how to rank the information bundles for a given decision maker. There are two main
motivations behind this objective. First, the impact of information on decisions has not
been studied in detail in engineering decision problems. The models do not address the
question of the choice of optimal information bundle to improve the decision. While
some work has been done to evaluate the value of specific information bundles under
specific scenarios for risk neutral decision makers, no work has been done to address
the ranking of a general class of information bundles for a general class of decision
makers. Second, information gathering plays a key role in reducing uncertainty in
enterprise risk management decisions. As new markets emerge and corporations begin
to move their facilities abroad, they are exposed to physical hazard risks about which
they may have minimal information. In order to improve their risk transfer decisions,
the corporations consider acquision of information about the new environment usually
at significant cost. Due to budget limitations, the decision maker must determine the
most valuable information for risk management purposes.
In this research, we first addressed the question of value of information in simple
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lotteries. Simple lotteries provide an easy and a versatile way to model decisions under
uncertainty with a finite number of possible outcomes. As we have shown, the results
are extended to general lotteries in a trivial manner in case the number of actions chosen
optimal given different outcomes is finite. We computed value of information using the
expected utility approach for a class of information bundles due to computational ease.
We established the relation between the risk attitude and ranking of information as
well as the relation between the value of information and the level of initial wealth for
a class of utility functions and information bundles. All of our results were limited
to certain classes of utility functions and information bundles because of the lack of a
general monotonic relation between the determinants of the value of information and
the value of information.
In Chapter IV, the buying price of information is studied. The decision maker
is assumed to pay for information before making the decision, and the buying price
is the maximum amount the decision maker is willing to pay for information. It is
known however that the expected utility approach we employed in Chapter III does
not always induce the same ranking of information with the buying price approach.
We have characterized the relation between these two approaches in detail for a class
of information bundles. Furthermore, we established the relation between the buying
price and the risk attitude of the decision maker.
We study static and dynamic insurance decisions in Chapters V and VI. Chapter
V considers a static insurance decision problem where the decision maker purchases
coinsurance, and considers acquisition of information before making the decision. It is
not possible to obtain closed form expressions for the value of information, even for the
expected utility approach, so we used a particular form of a utility function for demon-
strating ranking of different information bundles. For the dynamic insurance decision
problem, we considered a decision maker considering insurance against business inter-
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ruption risk in a facility exposed to multiple risk factors. We build a simulation model
to compute the value of information on severity of risk events and the time of the risk
events. The model provided preliminiary results for a real life problem at GM, in which
the company seeks information to reduce uncertainty about physical risks that their
facilities are exposed to. In this respect, there is a nice interplay between our results
for both the static and dynamic insurance decisions and enterprise risk management.
VII.2. Directions for Future Research
The main objective of this research is to quantify information in engineering de-
cision problems. To this end, we present some general and model specific results that
evaluates information bundles and establishes their preference orderings for different
decision makers. We restricted our results in general to specific classes of information
bundles and a specific class of utility functions. It is our intention to obtain a general
result for value of information bundles using expected utility approach for a class of
utility functions, removing the restriction on the information bundles. Uniform conti-
nuity of the value of information map with respect to the metrics proposed by Zandt
[38] and Boylan [6] has been established. We think it is possible to find a metric that
ranks the information bundles by comparing their similarity to a target information
bundle, i.e. the information bundle that provides perfect information for a class of
utility functions. Ohlson [30] offers a similar result, he shows that identical ranking of
information bundles for a class of utility functions exists. However, he does not address
the question of what does the similarity of two information bundles imply with respect
to their value to the decision maker. Such a result could enable us to rank information
bundles independent of the specific utility function, as long as the utility function is a
member of the specific class we consider.
Our results for lotteries are far from being complete. We restricted our analysis
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to a specific class of information bundles, especially in Chapter IV. We plan to extend
our analysis to more general information bundles and analyze the buying price of the
more complex information bundles. Futhermore, we believe it is possible to construct
the relation for the value of information using expected utility approach between sim-
ilar information bundles, i.e., computation of the value of information bundle can be
computed using the value of a similar information bundle. This will help us compute
the value of information for more complex information bundles.
As we mentioned earlier, our results have applications in enterprise risk manage-
ment. The case study in Chapter VI offered a simple model for risk events that hit
a single facility producing a single product serving a single product. We would like
to extend that model to include multiple facilities serving multiple markets producing
multiple products in that each product is priced differently in each market and service
cost to each market is unequal. The numerical results were taken using a single utility
function. However, it is not possible to determine a single utility function that repre-
sents the preferences of the enterprise, so we plan to obtain the robustness of the result
using different utility functions. An obvious extension is to model the time between
the recovery from the last risk event and the time to next risk event using semi Markov
processes. We believe the analytical results are difficult to obtain, so in many cases
simulations will be crucial.
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